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ABSTRACT
Understanding the fundamental limits of communication systems involves both con-
structing efficient coding schemes as well as proving mathematically that certain perfor-
mance is impossible to achieve; the latter is known as the converse problem in information
theory. This thesis focused on the converse problems for complex information systems
such as self-repair distributed storage and coded caching systems, and our goal was to
establish tight converse results for such systems by exploiting problem-specific combina-
torial structures.
The main part of this thesis dealt with exact-repair regenerating codes, which were first
proposed by Dimakis et al. in 2010. In particular, we considered two extensions of the
original setting of Dimakis et al., namely 1) multilevel diversity coding with regeneration
and 2) secure exact-repair regenerating codes. For the problem of multilevel diversity
coding with regeneration, we showed, via the proposed combinatorial approach, that the
natural separate encoding strategy can achieve the optimal tradeoff between the normalized
storage capacity and repair bandwidth at the minimum-bandwidth rate (MBR) point. This
settled a conjecture by Tian and Liu in 2015.
For the problem of secure exact-repair regenerating codes, all known results from the
literature showed that the achievable tradeoff regions between the normalized storage ca-
pacity and repair bandwidth have a single corner point, achieved by a scheme proposed
by Shah, Rashmi and Kumar (the SRK point). Since the achievable tradeoff regions of
the exact-repair regenerating code problem without any secrecy constraints were known
to have multiple corner points in general, these existing results suggested a phase-change-
like behavior, i.e., enforcing a secrecy constraint immediately reduces the tradeoff region
to one with a single corner point. In our work, we first showed that when the secrecy
ii
parameter is sufficiently large, the SRK point is indeed the only corner point of the trade-
off region. However, when the secrecy parameter is small, we showed that the tradeoff
region can, in fact, have multiple corner points. In particular, we established a precise
characterization of the tradeoff region for a particular problem instance, which has exactly
two corner points. Thus, a smooth transition, instead of a phase-change-type of transition,
should be expected as the secrecy constraint is gradually strengthened.
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NOMENCLATURE
N The set of natural numbers
MDC Multilevel Diversity Coding
DS Distributed Storage
MBR Minimum Bandwidth Rate
MSR Minimum Storage Rate
Inner Bound Sufficient condition for an achievable rate
Outer Bound Necessary condition for an achievable rate
H(X) Entropy of X , computed as
H(X) = −
∑
x∈X
p(x) log p(x)
(
n
k
)
Binomial number, the number of different ways of
choosing a k-elements subset from a total of n elements
[N ] Set {1, 2, . . . , N} for N ∈ N
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Exact-Repair Regenerating Codes
The focus of this thesis is distributed and cloud storage systems. Fault tolerance and
node repair are two fundamental ingredients of reliable distributed storage systems. While
the study of fault tolerance via diversity coding has been in the literature for decades [1–6],
systematic studies of node repair mechanisms were started only recently by Dimakis et al.
in their pioneering work [7]. A particular model, which has received a significant amount
of attention in the literature, is the so-called exact-repair regenerating code problem.
More specifically, in an (n, k, d) exact-repair regenerating code problem, a file M of
size B is to be encoded and then stored in a total of n distributed storage nodes, each of
capacity α. The encoding needs to ensure that: 1) the file M can be perfectly recovered
by having full access to any k out of the total n storage nodes; 2) when a node failure
occurs, the failed node can be regenerated by extracting data of size β from each of an
arbitrary set of d remaining nodes. These two system requirements, the file recovery and
node regeneration, are shown in Figure 1.1 respectively.
Figure 1.1: System requirement for file recovery function (left) and node regenerating
function (right) for an (n, k, d) regenerating code.
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Figure 1.2: The regions above the solid line is the optimal normalized storage-capacity 
repair-bandwidth tradeoff region for the (4, 3, 3) exact-repair regenerating code, while the 
dashed line is the outer bound obtained by cut-set bound approach. Reprinted with 
permission from [8].
Our goal is to characterize the region for all possible normalized storage-capacity and
bandwidth rate pair defined as
(
α¯, β¯
)
=
(
α
B
,
β
B
)
(1.1)
where B is the size of the file. An important technical contribution of [7] was to show that
there is an inherent tradeoff between the node capacity α and the repair bandwidth β in
satisfying both the file-recovery and node-regeneration requirements. In particular, it has
been shown [9] that the achievable normalized storage-capacity repair-bandwidth trade-
off region for any (n, k, d) exact-repair regenerating code problem with k > 1 features
multiple corner points including the the all-important minimum storage rate (MSR) and
minimum bandwidth rate (MBR) points.
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Fig. 1.2 illustrates the optimal normalized storage-capacity repair-bandwidth tradeoff
region (the region above the solid line) for the (4, 3, 3) exact-repair regenerating code
problem, which features three corner points including the MSR point (1/3, 1/3) and the
MBR point (1/2, 1/6). To prove that the optimal tradeoffs are indeed precisely character-
ized by the solid lines, one has to show that: 1) any rate pair
(
α¯, β¯
)
above the solid line
is achievable. In particular, this can be accomplished by showing that all corner points
of the rate region are achievable; 2) any rate pair
(
α¯, β¯
)
below the solid lines cannot be
achieved by any coding scheme. In the information theory literature, this is usually known
as the converse problem and is the main focus of this thesis.
In information theory, the standard approach for establishing converse results is via
the so-called cut-set bounds [10]. The cut-set bounds are a set of outer bounds on the
tradeoff region obtained via the graph-theoretic notion of cuts. The dotted lines in Fig. 1.2
illustrate the cut-set bounds for the (4, 3, 3) exact-repair regenerating code problem. As
we can see, the cut-set bounds, though readily available, are strictly suboptimal in terms
of characterizing the optimal tradeoffs for the exact-repair regenerating code problem.1
Instead, the optimal tradeoffs as illustrated by the solid lines were established by Tian [8]
via a recently proposed computational approach.
In Tian’s computational approach [8], the converse problem is formulated as linear
programs (LPs). The constraints of the LPs are given by the system requirements writ-
ten in terms of the (Shannon) entropies [10], as well as the intrinsic relations among the
entropies. The nature of the computational approach is to develop efficient algorithms
to the solve the LPs by exploring the built-in symmetries of the problem. Unfortunately,
the size of the LPs grows extremely fast with the number of the nodes n in the system.
Given today’s computational capabilities, the proposed computational approach [8] does
1The cut-set bounds, however, are indeed optimal under a weaker notion of the repair requirement known
as the functional repair [7].
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not appear to be viable for n ≥ 10.
We conclude this section by mentioning that despite intensive research efforts that have
yielded many highly non-trivial partial results [7–9,11], the optimal tradeoffs between the
node capacity α and repair bandwidth β have not been fully understood for the general
(n, k, d) exact-repair regenerating code problem.
1.2 Thesis Outline
In this thesis we shall focus on two extensions of the exact-repair regenerating code
problem [7], namely multilevel diversity coding with regeneration and secure exact-repair
regenerating codes. In particular, in Chapter 2 we shall address the optimality of a natural
superposition coding scheme for the problem of multilevel diversity coding with regen-
eration. Our results have been presented at the 50th Annual Conference on Information
Sciences and Systems (CISS) in 2016 [12]. In Chapter 3, we shall address an open con-
jecture in the literature [13, 14] regarding to a polyhedral property of the tradeoff region
of the secure exact-repair regenerating code problem. Our results have been submitted
to the 2017 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT) and the IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory.
From the methodology viewpoint, our focus is on the converse problems which we
view as combinatorial problems. Different from the traditional approach that relies on the
cut-set bounds [7], our goal is to obtain tight converse results by exploring the problem-
specific combinatorial structures of the problems. Also different from the recently pro-
posed computational approach [8] which is numerical by nature, our approach is analytical
and is targeted at problems of general parameters.
Finally in Chapter 4, we shall consider a related problem known as coded caching in
the literature [15]. In particular, we shall use the combinatorial approach to address the
optimality of the so-called Maddah-Ali-Niesen coding scheme [15] when there are a large
4
number of users in the system.
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2. MULTILEVEL DIVERSITY CODING WITH REGENERATING
2.1 Introduction
The multilevel diversity regenerating code1 problem was first introduced by Tian and
Liu in [16] (where it was called multilevel diversity coding with regeneration (MLDR)). In
an (n, d) multilevel diversity regenerating code problem, a total of d independent files
M1, . . . ,Md of size B1, . . . , Bd, respectively, are to be stored in n distributed storage
nodes, each of capacity α. The encoding needs to ensure that the file Mk can be per-
fectly recovered by having full access to any k out of the total n storage nodes for any
k ∈ {1, . . . , d}. In addition, when node failures occur and there are only d remaining
nodes in the system, it is required the data originally stored in any failed node can be re-
covered by downloading data of size β from each one of the d remaining nodes. Figure
2.1 illustrate the system requirement for file recovery and node regeneration respectively.
Figure 2.1: System requirement for file recovery (left) and node regenerating (right) for a
multilevel diversity coding with regenerating system.
Based on the above description, it should be clear that an (n, k, d) regenerating code
1Reprinted with permission from "Multilevel diversity coding with regeneration: Separate coding
achieves the MBR point," by S. Shao, T. Liu, and C. Tian, in Proc. 50th Ann. Conf. Inf. Sci. Systems
(CISS), Princeton, NJ, USA, Mar. 2016, pp. 602–607, copyright [2016] by IEEE.
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problem can be thought of as a special case of the (n, d) multilevel diversity regenerating
code problem with Bk = B and Bj = 0 for all j 6= k. From the code construction
perspective, it is thus natural to consider the so-called separate encoding scheme for the
multilevel diversity regenerating code problem. That is, to construct an (n, d) multilevel
diversity regenerating code, we may simply use an (n, k, d) regenerating code to encode
file Mk for each k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, and the coded messages for each file remain separate
when stored in the storage nodes and during the repair processes.
2.2 Problem Formulation and Known Results
Let (n, d,N1, . . . , Nd, T, S) be a tuple of positive integers such that n ≥ d + 1 ≥ 3.
Formally, an (n, d,N1, . . . , Nd, T, S) multilevel diversity regenerating code consists of:
• for each i ∈ [1 : n], a message-encoding function fi :
∏d
k=1[1 : Nk]→ [1 : T ];
• for each A ⊆ [1 : n] : |A| ∈ [1 : d], a message-decoding function gA : [1 : T ]|A| →∏|A|
k=1[1 : Nk];
• for each B ⊆ [1 : n] : |B| = d, i ∈ B, and j ∈ 1 : [n] \B, a repair-encoding function
fBi→j : [1 : T ]→ [1 : S]; and
• for each B ⊆ [1 : n] : |B| = d and j ∈ [1 : n] \ B, a repair-decoding function
gBj : [1 : S]
d → [1 : T ].
For each k ∈ [1 : d], let Mk be a message that is uniformly distributed over [1 : Nk].
The messages M1, . . . ,Md are assumed to be mutually independent. For each i ∈ [1 : n],
let Wi = fi(M1, . . . ,Md) be the data stored at the ith storage node, and for each B ⊆ [1 :
n] : |B| = d, i ∈ B, and j ∈ [1 : n] \ B, let SBi→j = fBi→j(Wi) be the data downloaded from
the ith storage node in order to regenerate the data originally stored at the jth storage node
7
under the context of repair group B. Obviously,
(Bk = logNk : k ∈ [1 : d]), α = log T, and β = logS
represent the message rates, storage capacity, and repair bandwidth, respectively.
A normalized message-rate storage-capacity repair-bandwidth tuple (B¯1, . . . , B¯d, α¯, β¯)
is said to be achievable if an (n, d,N1, . . . , Nd, T, S) multilevel diversity regenerating code
can be found such that:
B¯k =
Bk∑d
i=1Bi
∀k ∈ [1 : d], (2.1)
α¯ =
α∑d
i=1Bi
, β¯ =
β∑d
i=1Bi
, (2.2)
(M1, . . . ,M|A|) = gA(Wi : i ∈ A)
∀A ⊆ [1 : n] : |A| ∈ [1 : d], and (2.3)
Wj = g
B
j (S
B
i→j : i ∈ B)
∀B ⊆ [1 : n] : |B| = d and j ∈ [1 : n] \ B. (2.4)
The closure of all achievable (B¯1, . . . , B¯d, α¯, β¯) tuple is the achievable normalized message-
rate storage-capacity repair-bandwidth tradeoff regionRn,d for the (n, d) multilevel diver-
sity regenerating code problem. For a fixed normalized message-rate tuple (B¯1, . . . , B¯d),
the achievable normalized storage-capacity repair-bandwidth tradeoff region is the collec-
tion of all normalized storage-capacity repair-bandwidth pairs (α¯, β¯) such that
(B¯1, . . . , B¯d, α¯, β¯) ∈ Rn,d and is denoted byRn,d(B¯1, . . . , B¯d).
As mentioned previously in the introduction, an (n, k, d,N, T, S) regenerating code
can be thought of as an (n, d,N1, . . . , Nd, T, S) multilevel diversity regenerating code
with Nk = N and Ni = 1 for all i ∈ [1 : d] \ {k}. Thus, for the (n, k, d) regenerat-
8
α¯β¯
0
(7/18,11/36)
(5/12,1/4)
(4/9,2/9)
(1/2,7/36)
(8/15,8/45)
MBR point
MSR point
β¯ = 8/45
α¯+ 3β¯ = 16/15
Figure 2.2: The optimal tradeoff curve between the normalized storage-capacity α¯ and
repair-bandwidth β¯ (the solid line) and the best possible tradeoffs that can be achieved
by separate coding (dashed line) for the (4, 3) multilevel diversity coding problem with
(B¯1, B¯2, B¯3) = (0, 1/3, 2/3) [16]. The two new outer bounds (2.9) and (2.10) intersect
precisely at the MBR point (8/15, 8/45). Graph is cited from [12].
ing code problem, the achievable normalized storage-capacity repair-bandwidth tradeoff
regionRn,k,d is simply given byRn,d(0, . . . , 0, B¯k = 1, 0, . . . , 0).
Based on the connection between the regenerating code and the multilevel diversity
regenerating code problems mentioned above, a natural approach for constructing an
(n, d,N1, . . . , Nd, T, S) multilevel diversity regenerating code is to use to an
(n, k, d,Nk, Tk, Sk) regenerating code to encode the message Mk separately for each k ∈
[1 : d]. Since the coded data are kept separate during the encoding and repair processes,
we have
T =
d∏
k=1
Tk and S =
d∏
k=1
Sk.
Thus, for the (n, d) multilevel diversity regenerating code problem, the separate cod-
ing normalized storage-capacity repair-bandwidth tradeoff region Rˆn,d(B¯1, . . . , B¯d) for
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a fixed normalized message-rate tuple (B¯1, . . . , B¯d) is given by:
((
d∑
k=1
α¯kB¯k,
d∑
k=1
β¯kB¯k
)
: (α¯k, β¯k) ∈ Rn,k,d
)
. (2.5)
Despite being a natural scheme, it was shown in [16] that separate coding is in general
suboptimal in achieving the optimal tradeoffs between the normalized storage-capacity
and repair-bandwidth. Figure 2.2 shows the optimal tradeoff curve between the normal-
ized storage-capacity and repair-bandwidth and the best possible tradeoffs that can be
achieved by separate coding for (4, 3) multilevel diversity regenerating code problem with
(B¯1, B¯2, B¯3) = (0, 1/3, 2/3) [16]. Clearly, for this example, separate coding is strictly
suboptimal when α¯ ∈ (5/12, 1/2). On the other hand, when α¯ ≤ 5/12 or α¯ ≥ 1/2,
separate coding can in fact achieve the optimal tradeoffs. In particular, for this example,
separate encoding achieves the minimum-storage-regenerating (MSR) point (7/18, 11/36)
and the minimum-bandwidth-regenerating (MBR) point (8/15, 8/45).
That separate coding can achieve the MSR point for the above example is, in fact,
not incidental. For a general (n, d) multilevel diversity regenerating code problem, it
was shown in [16] that any achievable normalized message-rate storage-capacity repair-
bandwidth tuple (B¯1, . . . , B¯d, α¯, β¯) ∈ Rn,d must satisfy:
α¯ ≥
d∑
k=1
B¯k
k
(2.6)
and (d− 1)α¯ + β¯ ≥
d∑
k=1
(d− 1)(d+ 1− k) + 1
k(d+ 1− k) B¯k. (2.7)
When set as equalities, the intersection of (2.6) and (2.7) is given by
(α¯, β¯) =
(
d∑
k=1
B¯k
k
,
d∑
k=1
(d+ 1− k)B¯k
k
)
.
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Figure 2.3: The repair diagram of Duursma [11] for the (5, 4) multilevel diversity regener-
ating code problem. The collections of coded data in (2.12)–(2.15) for k = 4 are illustrated
in (a)–(d), respectively.
For any k ∈ [1 : d], the MSR point for the (n, k, d) regenerating code problem can be
written as [7]:
(
1
k
,
d+ 1− k
k
)
∈ Rn,k,d. (2.8)
We may thus conclude immediately from (2.5) that separate coding can achieve the MSR
point for the general (n, d) multilevel diversity regenerating code problem.
As mentioned previously in the introduction, an (n, k, d,N, T, S) regenerating code
can be thought of as an (n, d,N1, . . . , Nd, T, S) multilevel diversity regenerating code
with Nk = N and Ni = 1 for all i ∈ [1 : d] \ {k}. Thus, for the (n, k, d) regenerat-
ing code problem, the achievable normalized storage-capacity repair-bandwidth tradeoff
regionRn,k,d is simply given byRn,d(0, . . . , 0, B¯k = 1, 0, . . . , 0).
2.3 New Results
Our main result for this section is to show that separate coding can achieve the MBR
point for a general (n, d) multilevel diversity regenerating code problem as well. From
the technical viewpoint, this is mainly accomplished by establishing the following two
new outer bounds for the achievable normalized message-rate storage-capacity repair-
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bandwidth tradeoff regionRn,d.
Theorem 1. For a general (n, d) multilevel diversity regenerating code problem, any
achievable normalized message-rate storage-capacity repair-bandwidth tuple
(B¯1, . . . , B¯d, α¯, β¯) ∈ Rn,d must satisfy:
β¯ ≥
d∑
k=1
T−1d,k B¯k, (2.9)
and α¯ + Jd−1β¯ ≥ Jd
d∑
k=1
T−1d,k B¯k (2.10)
where Jd :=
∑d
i=1 i and Td,k :=
∑k
i=1(d+ 1− i).
When set as equalities, the intersection of (2.9) and (2.10) is given by:
(
α¯, β¯
)
=
(
d
d∑
k=1
T−1d,k B¯k,
d∑
k=1
T−1d,k B¯k
)
.
For any k ∈ [d], the MBR point for the (n, k, d) regenerating code problem can be written
as [7]
(
dT−1d,k , T
−1
d,k
) ∈ Rn,k,d. (2.11)
We may thus conclude immediately that separate coding can achieve the MBR point for
the general (n, d) multilevel diversity regenerating code problem.
For the example considered in Figure 2.2, the outer bounds (2.9) and (2.10) have also
been plotted in the same figure. As illustrated, they intersect precisely at the MBR point
(8/15, 8/45). Interestingly, for this example at least, the outer bound (2.10) is tight only
at the MBR point.
Our proof of the theorem is rather long and technical, meanwhile some lemmas are
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applied to proceed the proof of our theorem. All proof of the lemmas is deferred to Ap-
pendix A to enhance the flow of the paper. The main ingredients of the proof are summa-
rized below:
1) First note that the outer bounds (2.9) and (2.10) are independent of the total number
of storage nodes n in the system. In fact, in our proof, we only need to focus on
the cases where n = d + 1. For the cases where n > d + 1, since any subsystem
consisting of d+1 out of the total n storage nodes must give rise to an (n = d+1, d)
multilevel diversity regenerating code problem, the outer bounds (2.9) and (2.10)
must apply as well.
2) When n = d+ 1, any repair group B of size d is uniquely determined by the node j
to be repaired, i.e., B = [1 : n] \ {j}, and hence can be dropped from the notation
SBi,j without causing any confusion. Furthermore, due to the built-in symmetry in the
problem, to prove (2.9) and (2.10) we only need to consider the so-called symmet-
rical codes [8], for which the joint entropy of any subset of random variables from
{Mk : k ∈ [1 : d]}∪{Wi : i ∈ [1 : d+ 1]}∪{Si,j : i, j ∈ [1 : d+ 1], i 6= j} remains
unchanged under any permutation over the storage-node indices.
3) Our proof of the outer bounds (2.9) and (2.10) uses the classical peeling arguments,
which are the landmarks of the converse proofs for multilevel diversity coding prob-
lems. The peeling argument was first introduced by Roche et al. [3] for the (sym-
metrical) multilevel diversity coding problem without any repair requirement, and
was subsequently used in [16] to prove the outer bounds (2.6) and (2.7) for the mul-
tilevel diversity regenerating code problem. As a matter of fact, in [16] the outer
bound (2.6) was proved by ignoring the repair requirement (2.4), and hence the re-
sult followed directly from [3, Theorem].
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4) To apply the peeling arguments, one need to identify appropriate collections of
coded data that allow successive recovery of the messages (M1, . . . ,Md). To prove
the outer bounds (2.6) and (2.7), the collections of coded data utilized in [3] and [16]
were
{Wi : i ∈ [1 : k]} (2.12)
and
{Wi : i ∈ [2 : k]} ∪ {Si,1 : i ∈ [k + 1 : d+ 1]} (2.13)
for k ∈ [1 : d]. To prove the new outer bounds (2.9) and (2.10), we shall consider
the collections of coded data
{Si,j : j ∈ [1 : k], i ∈ [j + 1 : d+ 1]} (2.14)
and
{W1} ∪ {Si,j : j ∈ [2 : k], i ∈ [j + 1 : d+ 1]} (2.15)
for k ∈ [1 : d]. The structure of all four collections of coded data above can be nicely
illustrated using the repair diagram introduced by Duursma [11]; see Figure 2.3. It is
straightforward to verify that for each k ∈ [1 : d], the coded data {Wi : i ∈ [1 : k]},
and hence the message Mk, can be recovered from each one of the collections of
coded data above.
2.4 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of (2.9). To prove the outer bound (2.9), we shall apply a peeling argument that
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utilizes the collection of coded data (2.14), which can now be compactly written as L(k)0
using the newly introduced notations from above. The following telescoping result on L(k)0
plays an essential role in our proof.
Proposition 1 (Telescoping over L(k)0 ). For any symmetrical
(n = d+ 1, d, (N1, . . . , Nd), T, S) multilevel diversity regenerating code that satisfies the
repair requirement (2.4), we have
T−1d,kH(L
(k)
0 |M(k)) ≥ T−1d,k+1H(L(k+1)0 |M(k)) (2.16)
for any k ∈ [1 : d− 1].
We now prove the following inequality by induction:
β ≥
k∑
j=1
T−1d,j Bj + T
−1
d,kH(L
(k)
0 |M(k)) (2.17)
for any k ∈ [1 : d]. Note that
β
(a)
≥ T−1d,1
d+1∑
i=2
H(Si,1)
(b)
≥ T−1d,1H(L1)
(c)
= T−1d,1H(L1,M1)
(d)
= T−1d,1B1 + T
−1
d,1H(L1|M1),
and thus (2.17) holds for k = 1. Here, (a) follows from the repair-bandwidth constraints
H(Si,1) ≤ β for i ∈ [2 : d+ 1] and the fact that Td,1 = d; (b) is due to the union bound on
entropy; (c) follows from the fact that M1 is a function of W1 and hence a function of L1;
and (d) is due to the chain rule for entropy and the fact that H(M1) = B1.
Now assume that (2.17) holds for some k ∈ [1 : d − 1]. Substituting the telescoping
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result (2.16) into (2.17), we have
β ≥
k∑
j=1
Td,jBj + Td,k+1H(L
(k+1)
0 |M(k))
(a)
=
k∑
j=1
Td,jBj + Td,k+1H(L
(k+1)
0 ,Mk+1|M(k))
(b)
=
k∑
j=1
Td,jBj + Td,k+1H(Mk+1|M(k))+
Td,k+1H(L
(k+1)
0 |M(k),Mk+1)
(c)
=
k+1∑
j=1
Td,jBj + Td,k+1H(L
(k+1)
0 |M(k+1)),
which completes the induction and hence the proof of (2.17). Here, (a) follows from the
fact that Mk+1 is a function of W(k+1), which is turn a function of L
(k+1)
0 ; (b) is by the
chain rule for conditional entropy; and (c) follows from the facts that all messages are
independent and that H(Mk+1) = Bk+1. This completes the induction step and hence the
proof of (2.17).
Setting k = d in (2.17) and by the fact that H(L(d)0 |M(d)) ≥ 0, we have
β ≥
d∑
j=1
Td,jBj. (2.18)
Normalizing both sides of (2.18) by
∑d
k=1Bk completes the proof of the outer bound (2.9).
Proof of (2.10). To prove the outer bound (2.10), we shall apply a peeling argument
that utilizes the collections of coded data (2.14) and (2.15), which can now be compactly
written as L(k)0 and L
(k)
1 , respectively. In addition to Proposition 1, our proof also relies on
the following telescoping result on L(k)1 .
Proposition 2 (Telescoping over L(k)1 ). For any symmetrical (n = d+1, d, (N1, . . . , Nd), T, S)
16
multilevel diversity regenerating code that satisfies the repair requirement (2.4), we have
H(L
(k)
1 |M(k)) + (d− k)T−1d,kH(L(k)0 |M(k)) ≥ H(L(k+1)1 |M(k)) (2.19)
for any k ∈ [1 : d− 1].
We now prove the following inequality by induction:
α + Jd−1β ≥ Jd
k∑
j=1
Td,jBj +H(L
(k)
1 |M(k))+
Jd−kTd,kH(L
(k)
0 |M(k)) (2.20)
for any k ∈ [1 : d]. Note that
α + Jd−1β
(a)
≥ H(W1) + Jd−1d−1
d+1∑
i=2
H(Si,1)
(b)
≥ H(W1) + Jd−1T−1d,1H(L1)
(c)
= H(W1,M1) + Jd−1T−1d,1H(L1,M1)
(d)
= H(M1) +H(W1|M1) + Jd−1T−1d,1H(M1)+
Jd−1T−1d,1H(L1|M1)
(e)
= (1 + Jd−1T−1d,1 )B1 +H(W1|M1) + Jd−1T−1d,1H(L1|M1)
(f)
= JdT
−1
d,1B1 +H(W1|M1) + Jd−1T−1d,1H(L1|M1),
and thus (2.20) holds for k = 1. Here, (a) follows from the storage-capacity constraint
H(W1) ≤ α and the repair-bandwidth constraints H(Si,1) ≤ β for i ∈ [2 : d + 1]; (b) is
by the union bound on entropy and the fact that Td,1 = d; (c) follows from the fact that M1
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is a function of W1 and hence a function of L1; (d) is due to the chain rule for entropy; (d)
is by the fact that H(M1) = B1; and (f) follows from the fact that
1 + Jd−1T−1d,1 = (Td,1 + Jd−1)T
−1
d,1
= (d+ Jd−1)T−1d,1 = JdT
−1
d,1 .
Now assume that (2.20) holds for some k ∈ [1 : d − 1]. Substituting the telescoping
result (2.19) into (2.20), we have
α + Jd−1β ≥ Jd
k∑
j=1
T−1d,j Bj +H(L
(k+1)
1 |M(k))+
[Jd−k − (d− k)]T−1d,kH(L(k)0 |M(k))
= Jd
k∑
j=1
T−1d,j Bj +H(L
(k+1)
1 |M(k))+
Jd−1−kT−1d,kH(L
(k)
0 |M(k)). (2.21)
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Further substituting (2.16) into (2.21), we have
α + Jd−1β
≥ Jd
k∑
j=1
T−1d,j Bj +H(L
(k+1)
1 |M(k))+
Jd−1−kT−1d,k+1H(L
(k+1)
0 |M(k))
(a)
= Jd
k∑
j=1
T−1d,j Bj +H(L
(k+1)
1 ,Mk+1|M(k))+
Jd−1−kT−1d,k+1H(L
(k+1)
0 ,Mk+1|M(k))
(b)
= Jd
k∑
j=1
T−1d,j Bj + (1 + Jd−1−kT
−1
d,k+1)H(Mk+1|M(k))+
H(L
(k+1)
1 |M(k+1)) + Jd−1−kT−1d,k+1H(L(k+1)0 |M(k+1))
(c)
= Jd
k∑
j=1
T−1d,j Bj + JdT
−1
d,k+1H(Mk+1|M(k))+
H(L
(k+1)
1 |M(k+1)) + Jd−1−kT−1d,k+1H(L(k+1)0 |M(k+1))
(d)
= Jd
k+1∑
j=1
T−1d,j Bj +H(L
(k+1)
1 |M(k+1))+
Jd−1−kT−1d,k+1H(L
(k+1)
0 |M(k+1)),
which completes the induction and hence the proof of (2.20). Here, (a) follows from the
fact that Mk+1 is a function of W(k+1), which is in turn a function of L
(k+1)
1 and further a
function of L(k+1)0 ; (b) is due to the chain rule for conditional entropy; (c) follows from the
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fact that
1 + Jd−1−kT−1d,k+1 = (Td,k+1 + Jd−1−k)T
−1
d,k+1
=
(
k+1∑
i=1
(d+ 1− i) + Jd−1−k
)
T−1d,k+1
=
(
d∑
i=d−k
i+ Jd−1−k
)
T−1n,k+1 = JdT
−1
d,k+1,
and (d) is due to the facts that all messages are independent and that H(Mk+1) = Bk+1.
This completes the induction step and hence the proof of (2.20).
Set k = d in (2.20). By the fact that H(L(d)1 |M(d)) ≥ 0 and J0 = 0, we have
α + Jd−1β ≥ Jd
k∑
j=1
T−1d,j Bj. (2.22)
Normalizing both sides of (2.22) by
∑d
k=1Bk completes the proof of the outer bound
(2.10).
We have thus completed the proof of Theorem 1.
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3. SECURE EXACT-REPAIR REGENERATING CODES
3.1 Introduction
In this paper, we consider an extension of the aforementioned exact-repair regener-
ating code problem, which further requires certain security guarantee during the node-
regeneration processes. The (n, k, d, `) secure exact-repair regenerating code problem
that we consider is the standard (n, k, d) exact-repair regenerating code problem [7–9,11],
with the additional constraint that the file M needs to be kept information-theoretically
secure against an eavesdropper that can access the data extracted to regenerate a total of
` different failed nodes (possibly under different repair groups). Apparently, this is only
possible when ` < k. Furthermore, when ` = 0, the secrecy constraint degenerates,
and the (n, k, d, `) secure exact-repair regenerating code problem reduces to the (n, k, d)
exact-repair regenerating code problem without any security constraints.
More specifically, the (n, k, d, `) secure exact-repair regenerating code problem has
following constraints:
• file recovery: in this case, we introduce a random keyK, which is applied to encipher
the file M. Instead of storing file M directly into n nodes, we store a enciphered file.
As shown in Figure 3.1, when we can fully access to any k nodes, we can recovery
the deciphered file M again, but we don’t have to recovery the random key.
• node regeneration: similar to exact-repair regenerating codes without secrecy con-
straint, there’s a constraint on node regeneration. As shown in Figure 3.2, when any
node is failed and we can extract data from any d other nodes for β bits per node at
most, we can regenerate the failed node.
• information theoretic secure: the eavesdropper that can access the data extracted to
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Figure 3.1: The file recovery constraint for (n, k, d) secure exact-repair regenerating codes.
Figure 3.2: The node regeneration constraint for (n, k, d) secure exact-repair regenerating
codes.
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regenerate a total of ` different failed nodes. We require the mutual information
between file M and collected data is zero for any ` nodes.
Under the additional secrecy constraint (` ≥ 1), the optimal tradeoffs between the
node capacity α and repair bandwidth β have been studied in [13,14,17–19]. In particular,
Shah, Rashmi and Kumar [19] showed that a particular tradeoff point (referred to as the
SRK point) can be obtained by extending an MBR code based on the product-matrix con-
struction proposed in [9]. Later, it was shown that the SRK point is the only corner point
of the tradeoff region for the cases where we have either d = 2, 3 [13], or d = 4 [14], or
k = 2 [13], or ` = k − 1 = d − 1 [13]. This is in sharp contrast to the original exact-
repair regenerating code problem [7–9, 11] without any secrecy constraints, for which, as
mentioned previously, the tradeoff region features multiple corner points when k > 1.
Fig. 3.3 also illustrates the tradeoff region for the (4, 3, 3, 1) secure exact-repair regen-
erating code problem, which features a single corner point at (1, 1/3). Thus, the existing
results from [13,14] seem to suggest a phase-change-like behavior that enforcing a secrecy
constraint immediately reduces the tradeoff region from one with multiple corner points
(` = 0) to one with a single corner point (` ≥ 1).
The main results of this paper are two-folded.
• We first show, via new converse results, that for any given (k, d) pair, there is a
lower bound on `, denoted by `∗(k, d), such that when ` ≥ `∗(k, d), the SRK point
is indeed the only conner point of the tradeoff region for the (n, k, d, `) secure exact-
repair regenerating code problem. As we shall see, the lower bound `∗(k, d) ≤ k−1
for any (k, d) pair, and thus the tradeoff region for any (n, k, d, `) problem with
` = k − 1 or k = 2 must have a single corner point. In addition, the lower bound
`∗(k, d) = 1 for any d ∈ [2 : 4]. Therefore, our result includes all previous results
from [13] and [14] as special cases.
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Figure 3.3: The regions above the solid and the dashed lines are the achievable normalized
storage-capacity repair-bandwidth tradeoff regions for the (4, 3, 3) exact-repair regenerat-
ing code without and with secrecy constraints respectively.
• Next, we show that when 1 ≤ ` < `∗(k, d), it is entirely possible that the tradeoff
region features multiple corner points. In particular, we establish a precise charac-
terization of the tradeoff region for the (7, 6, 6, 1) problem, which has exactly two
corner points (see Fig. 3.4 for an illustration). This result requires new achievability
results as well as new converse results, the former of which are obtained by extend-
ing the layered coding scheme proposed in [20]. From the viewpoint of the rate
region, our result suggests that a smooth transition, instead of a phase-change-type
of transition, should be expected as the secrecy constraint is gradually strengthened
by increasing the parameter `.
3.2 Problem Formulation and Known Results
Let (n, k, d,N,K, T, S) be a tuple of positive integers such that n ≥ d+1 ≥ k+1 ≥ 2.
Formally, an (n, k, d,N,K, T, S) code consists of:
• for each i ∈ [1 : n], a message-encoding function fi : [1 : N ]× [1 : K]→ [1 : T ];
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Figure 3.4: The regions above the solid line is the achievable normalized storage-capacity
repair-bandwidth tradeoff region for the (7, 6, 6, 1) secure exact-repair regenerating code
problem. In addition to the SRK point (2/15, 1/5), the tradeoff region has another corner
point at (3/8, 1/8).
• for each A ⊆ [1 : n] such that |A| = k, a message-decoding function gA : [1 :
T ]k → [1 : N ];
• for each B ⊆ [1 : n] such that |B| = d, i ∈ B, and j ∈ [1 : n] \ B, a repair-encoding
function fBi→j : [1 : T ]→ [1 : S];
• for each B ⊆ [1 : n] such that |B| = d and j ∈ [1 : n]\B, a repair-decoding function
gBj : [1 : S]
d → [1 : T ].
LetM be a message that is uniformly distributed over [1 : N ], and K be a secret key that
is uniformly distributed over [1 : K]. The message M and the secret key K are assumed to
be independent of each other. For each i ∈ [1 : n], let Wi = fi(M,K) be the data stored at
the ith storage node, and for each B ⊆ [1 : n] such that |B| = d, i ∈ B, and j ∈ [1 : n] \B,
let SBi→j = f
B
i→j(Wi) be the data extracted from the ith storage node in order to regenerate
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the data stored at the jth storage node under the context of repair group B. Obviously,
B = logN, α = log T, β = logS
represent the message rate, storage capacity, and repair bandwidth, respectively.
A normalized storage-capacity repair-bandwidth pair (α¯, β¯) is said to be achievable
for the (n, k, d, `) secure exact-repair regenerating code problem if an (n, k, d,N,K, T, S)
code can be found such that:
• (rate normalization)
α/B = α¯ and β/B = β¯; (3.1)
• (message recovery)
M = gA(Wi : i ∈ A) (3.2)
for any A ⊆ [1 : n] such that |A| = k;
• (node regeneration)
Wj = g
B
j (S
B
i→j : i ∈ B) (3.3)
for any B ⊆ [1 : n] such that |B| = d and j ∈ [1 : n] \ B;
• (repair secrecy)
I(M; (S→j : j ∈ E)) = 0 (3.4)
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for any E ⊆ [1 : n] such that |E| = `, where S→j := (SBi→j : B ⊆ [1 : n], |B| =
d, B 63 j, i ∈ B) is the collection of data that can be extracted from the other nodes
to regenerate node j.
The closure of all achievable (α¯, β¯) pairs is the achievable normalized storage-capacity
repair-bandwidth tradeoff region Rn,k,d,` for the (n, k, d, `) secure exact-repair regenerat-
ing code problem.
In [19], Shah, Rashmi and Kumar proved the following important achievability result
for the general (n, k, d, `) secure regenerating code problem:
(
dT−1k,d,`,, T
−1
k,d,`
) ∈ Rn,k,d,` (3.5)
where
Tk,d,` :=
k∑
i=`+1
(d+ 1− i). (3.6)
Note that when ` = 0 (no repair-secrecy constraint),
(
dT−1k,d,0, T
−1
k,d,0
)
recovers the MBR
point of the (n, k, d) exact-repair regenerating code problem [9]. It has been shown that
the SRK point (3.5) is the only corner point of the tradeoff region Rn,k,d,` for the cases
where we have either d = 2, 3 [13], or d = 4 [14], or k = 2 [13], or ` = k−1 = d−1 [13].
3.3 New Results
Consider the (n, k, d, `) secure exact-repair regenerating code problem (with ` ≥ 1),
and let
`∗(k, d) := min
{
` ≥ 1 : Tk,d,` ≤ d+
√
d`
}
. (3.7)
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Note that Tk,d,` is monotone non-increasing with respect to ` for any given (k, d) pair, so
we have
Tk,d,` ≤ d+
√
d`, ∀` ≥ `∗(k, d). (3.8)
We have the following two outer bounds for the tradeoff regionRn,k,d,`.
Theorem 2. For the general (n, k, d, `) secure exact-repair regenerating code problem,
any achievable normalized storage-capacity repair-bandwidth pair (α¯, β¯) ∈ Rn,k,d,` must
satisfy:
β¯ ≥ T−1k,d,`. (3.9)
In addition, when ` ≥ `∗(k, d), any achievable normalized storage-capacity repair-bandwidth
pair (α¯, β¯) ∈ Rn,k,d,` must also satisfy:
α¯ ≥ dT−1k,d,`. (3.10)
(Conversely, any (α¯, β¯) satisfying (3.9) and (3.10) is achievable.)
While the proof of (3.9) is straightforward, the proof of (3.10) is long and technical.
We shall defer the proof to Section 3.5. Combining (3.9) and (3.10) proves that the SRK
point (3.5) is the only corner point of the tradeoff region Rn,k,d,` when ` ≥ `∗(k, d). It
is straightforward to verify that the lower bound `∗(k, d) ≤ k − 1 for any (k, d) pair and
`∗(k, d) = 1 for d ∈ [2 : 4]. Therefore, Theorem 2 includes all previous results from [13]
and [14] as special cases.
Next, we shift our attention to the cases where 1 ≤ ` < `∗(k, d). To see how
the tradeoff region Rn,k,d,` may look like in this case, let us begin with the following
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achievability results for the (n, k, d, `) secure exact-repair regenerating code problem with
k = d = n− 1.
Theorem 3. For any t ∈ [2 : n− `], we have
(α¯t, β¯t) ∈ Rn,n−1,n−1,` (3.11)
where
(t− 1)α¯t = (n− 1)β¯t :=
 n− 1
t− 1
/
 n− `
t
. (3.12)
The proof is based on a new coding scheme, which we shall describe in the next sec-
tion. Note that when ` = 1, (α¯t, β¯t) can be simplified as:
(α¯t, β¯t) =
(
t
(t− 1)(n− t) ,
t
(n− 1)(n− t)
)
. (3.13)
In this case, when t = 2, (α¯t, β¯t) coincides with the SRK point (3.5) with k = d =
n − 1 and ` = 1. Furthermore, note that β¯t is monotone increasing with t, and α¯t is
monotone decreasing with t for any t ∈ [2 : n − 1] such that t2 + t < n. Thus, no
pairs of points from the set {(α¯2, β¯2), . . . , (α¯t+1, β¯t+1)} dominate each other for any t ∈
[2 : n − 1] such that t2 + t < n. For example, when n = 7, a second achievability
point (α¯3, β¯3) =
(
3
8
, 1
8
)
emerges in addition to the SKR point (α¯2, β¯2) =
(
2
5
, 1
15
)
. When
n = 13, a third achievability point (α¯4, β¯4) =
(
4
27
, 1
27
)
emerges in addition to the points
(α¯3, β¯3) =
(
3
20
, 1
40
)
and (α¯2, β¯2) =
(
2
11
, 1
66
)
. Therefore, for the (n, n− 1, n− 1, 1) secure
exact-repair regenerating code problem, the SRK point cannot be the only corner point
when n ≥ 7.
Next, we show that both (α¯2, β¯2) and (α¯3, β¯3) are optimal tradeoff points for the (n, n−
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1, n− 1, 1) secure exact-repair regenerating code problem when n ≥ 7, so in this case the
tradeoff region must have multiple corner points.
Theorem 4. For the (n, n − 1, n − 1, 1) secure exact-repair regenerating code problem
with n ≥ 7, any achievable normalized storage-capacity repair-bandwidth pair (α¯, β¯) ∈
Rn,n−1,n−1,1 must satisfy:
nα¯ +
(n− 1)(n− 6)
2
β¯ ≥ 3. (3.14)
Note that both
(α¯2, β¯2) =
(
2
n− 2 ,
2
(n− 1)(n− 2)
)
and (α¯3, β¯3) =
(
3
2(n− 3) ,
3
(n− 1)(n− 3)
)
satisfy the inequality (3.14) with equalities and hence cannot be dominated by a single
achievable tradeoff point.
Finally, we focus on the (n, n − 1, n − 1, 1) problem with n = 7 and show that the
tradeoff region has exactly two corner points at (α¯2, β¯2) and (α¯3, β¯3).
Theorem 5. For the (7, 6, 6, 1) secure exact-repair regenerating code problem, any achiev-
able normalized storage-capacity repair-bandwidth pair (α¯, β¯) ∈ R7,6,6,1 must satisfy:
α¯ ≥ 3
8
. (3.15)
Therefore, the tradeoff regionR7,6,6,1 is given by:
R7,6,6,1 =
{
(α¯, β¯) : β¯ ≥ 1
15
, 7α¯ + 3β¯ ≥ 3, α¯ ≥ 3
8
}
. (3.16)
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The proof of (3.14) and (3.15) can be found in Section 3.5.
3.4 A New (n, n− 1, n− 1, `) Code Construction
In this section, we provide a code construction based on the layered exact-repair re-
generating codes proposed in [20], which leads to the achievability of the tradeoff points
given in Theorem 3.
Fix a parameter t, and consider the following scheme. There are a total of B =(
n−`
t
)
(t−1) information symbols, denoted asM, and there are a total ofR = (n
t
)
(t−1)−B
random symbols, denoted as K. Assume that an eavesdropper has access to the repair mes-
sages to an arbitrary set of ` nodes, the collection of which is denoted as E.
We first encode the (R + B) =
(
n
t
)
(t − 1) symbols (in a finite field Fq such that
q ≥ 2(R + B), and q will be used as the basis of the entropy function), into the parity
check symbols of an (2(R+B), R+B) systematic MDS code. These R+B symbols are
broken into a total of
(
n
t
)
parity groups, each with (t− 1) symbols, and each parity group
is associated with a subset A of [1 : n] of cardinality t.
Next, we expand each parity group by introducing one additional parity symbol which
can be the simple linear sum of them, in the same finite field as earlier (or even in the binary
field, assuming the original one is an extension of the binary field). These t symbols are
then distributed into the subset of nodes associated with this parity group, one symbol to
each node.
We need to show that the following three conditions are satisfied:
1) Reconstruction with any n − 1 nodes. This is trivial since in each parity group, at
most one of them is in the failed node, and thus the contents of the parity group can
be recovered. This also implies that
αt =
(
n− 1
t− 1
)
. (3.17)
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2) Repair with the remaining n−1 nodes. Assume without loss of generality that node
1 fails. Then, to repair the symbol in the parity group associated with each A such
that 1 ∈ A and |A| = t, we can send from the remaining nodes all the other symbols
in this parity group. The total transmission is thus given by:
(n− 1)βt = (t− 1)αt. (3.18)
3) Security against any eavesdropper on ` nodes. We need to show that
I(M;E) = 0. (3.19)
This follows from
I(M;E) = H(E)−H(E|M)
= H(E)−H(E|M) +H(E|M,K)
= H(E)− I(E;K|M)
= H(E)−H(K|M) +H(K|M,E)
= H(E)−R +H(K|M,E).
All the parity groups that have symbols in the compromised nodes are completely
revealed by accessing E, and conversely all the symbols in E can be generated by
these parity groups alone. A total of
(
n
t
)−(n−`
t
)
parity groups are exposed, implying
that
H(E) ≤ R.
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W1 S2→1 S3→1 S4→1
W2
W3
W4
S1→2 S3→2 S4→2
S1→3 S2→3 S4→3
S1→4 S2→4 S3→4
W5S1→5 S2→5 S3→5 S4→5
S5→1
S5→2
S5→3
S5→4
W1 S2→1 S3→1 S4→1
W2
W3
W4
S1→2 S3→2 S4→2
S1→3 S2→3 S4→3
S1→4 S2→4 S3→4
W5S1→5 S2→5 S3→5 S4→5
S5→1
S5→2
S5→3
S5→4
W1 S2→1 S3→1 S4→1
W2
W3
W4
S1→2 S3→2 S4→2
S1→3 S2→3 S4→3
S1→4 S2→4 S3→4
W5S1→5 S2→5 S3→5 S4→5
S5→1
S5→2
S5→3
S5→4
(a) L0,4 (b) L1,4 (c) L2,4
Figure 3.5: Illustration of L0,4, L1,4 and L2,4 in the repair diagram for n = 5.
It only remains to show that
H(K|M,E) = 0. (3.20)
which follows from the fact that given the eavesdropper’s information and the mes-
sage M, the random symbols K can be completely recovered. This can be seen as
follows: there are a total of R symbols (after removing the simple sums in each
parity group) from E that were original parity symbols of the (2(R + B), R + B)
MDS code, but any R + B codeword symbols can be used to recover the original
information (M,R), which we indeed have together with theB information symbols.
Normalizing αt and βt by B proves the achievability of the tradeoff points given in Theo-
rem 3.
3.5 Proof of the Converse Results
3.5.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Let us first outline the main ingredients for proving the inequalities (3.9) and (3.10).
1) Total number of nodes. To prove the inequalities (3.9) and (3.10), let us first note
that these two inequalities are independent of the total number of storage nodes n in
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the system. In our proof, we only need to consider the cases where n = d + 1. For
the cases where n > d + 1, since any subsystem consisting of d + 1 out of the total
n storage nodes must give rise to a (d + 1, k, d, `) secure exact-repair regenerating
code problem. Therefore, these two inequalities as outer bounds must apply as well.
When n = d+ 1, any repair group B of size d is uniquely determined by the node j
to be repaired, i.e., B = [1 : n] \ {j}, and hence can be dropped from the notation
SBi→j without causing any confusion.
2) Code symmetry. Due to the built-in symmetry of the problem, to prove the inequal-
ities (3.9) and (3.10), we only need to consider the so-called symmetrical codes [8]
for which the joint entropy of any subset of random variables from
(M,K, (Wi : i ∈ [1 : n]), (Si→j : i, j ∈ [1 : n], i 6= j))
remains unchanged under any permutation over the storage-node indices.
3) Key collections of random variables. Focusing on the symmetrical (n = d +
1, d,N,K, T, S) codes, the following collections of random variables play a key
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role in our proof:
WA := (Wi : i ∈ A) , A ⊆ [1 : n] (3.21)
Si→B := (Si→j : j ∈ B) ,
i ∈ [1 : n], B ⊆ [1 : n] \ {i} (3.22)
SB→j := (Si→j : i ∈ B) ,
j ∈ [1 : n], B ⊆ [1 : n] \ {j} (3.23)
S→j := S[1:j−1]∪[j+1:n]→j, j ∈ [1 : n] (3.24)
S→B := (S→j : j ∈ B) , B ⊆ [1 : n] (3.25)
S→j := S[1:j−1]→j, j ∈ [1 : n] (3.26)
S→B := (S→j : j ∈ B), B ⊆ [1 : n] (3.27)
S→j := S[j+1:n]→j, j ∈ [1 : n] (3.28)
S→B := (S→j : j ∈ B), B ⊆ [1 : n] (3.29)
Lt,s := (W[1:t], S→[t+1:s]),
s ∈ [1 : n], t ∈ [0 : s]. (3.30)
In particular, the collection Lt,s defined in (3.30) was first identified in [12] for prov-
ing that separate encoding can achieve the MBR point for multilevel diversity coding
with regeneration. As we shall see, here it also plays a key role in our proof of (3.9)
and (3.10). Fig. 3.5 illustrates the structure of L0,4, L1,4 and L2,4 in the repair diagram
introduced by Duursma [11] for n = 5.
An important part of the proof is to understand the relations between the collections
of random variables defined above, and to use them to derive the desired converse results.
We have the following key lemmas, whose proof can be found in the Appendix.
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Lemma 1. For any (n = d+ 1, k, d,N,K, T, S) code that satisfies the node-regeneration
requirement (3.3), (S→[t+1:s],W[t+1:s]) is a function of Lt,s for any s ∈ [1 : n] and t ∈ [0 :
s− 1].
Lemma 2. For any symmetrical (n = d+ 1, k, d,N,K, T, S) code, we have
H(S1→[2:p+1]) +H(Lt,r, S[r+2:r+q+1]→r+1)
≥ H(S1→[2:p]) +H(Lt,r, S[r+2:r+q+2]→r+1) (3.31)
for any t ∈ [1 : 2], r ∈ [2 : k − 1], p ∈ [1 : r − t + 1], and q ∈ [0 : d− r − 1]. It follows
that
H(Lt,j) + Tk,d,jm
−1H(S1→[2:m+1]) ≥ H(Lt,k) (3.32)
for any t ∈ [1 : 2], j ∈ [2 : k], and m ∈ [1 : j − t+ 1].
Lemma 3. For any symmetrical (n = d+ 1, k, d,N,K, T, S) code that satisfies the node-
regeneration requirement (3.3), we have
d− t
n− jH(L1,j, Sj→1) +H(L1,t)
≥ d− t
n− jH(L1,j−1, Sj→1) +H(L1,t+1) (3.33)
for any j ∈ [2 : k − 1] and t ∈ [j : k − 1]. It follows that
H(L1,j, Sj→1) + (n− j)T−1k,d,mH(L1,m)
≥ H(L1,j−1, Sj→1) + (n− j)T−1k,d,mH(L1,k) (3.34)
for any j ∈ [2 : k − 1] and m ∈ [j : k − 1].
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The inequality (3.9) can now be proved as follows:
B = H(M)
(a)
= H(M|S→[1:`])
(b)
= H(M|S→[1:`],W[1:`])
≤ H(M, S→[`+1:k]|S→[1:`],W[1:`])
= H(M|S→[1:`],W[1:`], S→[`+1:k])
+H(S¯→[`+1:k]|S→[1:`],W[1:`])
= H(M|S→[1:`], L`,k) +H(S¯→[`+1:k]|S→[1:`],W[1:`])
(c)
= H(M|S→[1:`], L`,k,W[`+1:k])
+H(S¯→[`+1:k]|S→[1:`],W[1:`])
= H(M|S→[1:`], S→[`+1:k],W[1:k])
+H(S¯→[`+1:k]|S→[1:`],W[1:`])
(d)
= H(S¯→[`+1:k]|S→[1:`],W[1:`])
≤ H(S¯→[`+1:k])
(d)
≤ Tk,d,lβ
where (a) follows from the repair-secrecy constraint (3.4); (b) follows from the fact that
W[1:`] is a function of S→[1:`] due to the node-regeneration constraint (3.3); (c) follows
from the fact that W[`+1:k]) is a function of L`,k by Lemma 1; (d) follows from the fact that
H(M|S→[1:`], S→[`+1:k],W[1:k]) = 0 due to the message-recovery constraint (3.2); and (e)
follows from the bandwidth constraint on the repair messages. Normalizing both sides by
B completes the proof of (3.9).
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To prove the inequality (3.10), we shall consider the cases where Tk,d,` ≤ d and d ≤
Tk,d,` ≤ d+
√
d` separately.
Case 1: Tk,d,` ≤ d. In this case, we have
Tk,d,`α + dH(S→[1:`])
= Tk,d,`
(
α +H(S→[1:`])
)
+ (d− Tk,d,`)H(S→[1:`])
(a)
= Tk,d,`
(
α +H(S→[2:`+1]
)
+ (d− Tk,d,`)H(S→[1:`])
(b)
≥ Tk,d,`
(
H(W1) +H(S→[2:`+1])
)
+ (d− Tk,d,`)H(S→[1:`])
(c)
= Tk,d,`
(
H(W1, S1→[2:`+1]) +H(S→[2:`+1])
)
+ (d− Tk,d,`)H(S→[1:`])
(d)
≥ Tk,d,`
(
H(W1, S→[2:`+1]) +H(S1→[2:`+1])
)
+ (d− Tk,d,`)H(S→[1:`])
(e)
= Tk,d,`
(
H(W1, S→[2:`+1]) + Tk,d,`+1`−1H(S1→[2:`+1])
)
+ (d− Tk,d,`)
(
H(S→[1:`]) + Tk,d,``−1H(S1→[2:`+1])
)
(f)
≥ Tk,d,`
(
H(L1,`+1) + Tk,d,`+1`
−1H(S1→[2:`+1])
)
+ (d− Tk,d,`)
(
H(L1,`) + Tk,d,``
−1H(S1→[2:`+1])
)
(3.35)
where (a) follows from the fact that
H(S→[1:`]) = H(S→[2:`+1]) (3.36)
due to the symmetrical code that we consider; (b) is due to the storage-capacity constraint
H(W1) ≤ α; (c) is due to the fact that S1→[2:`+1] is a function of W1; (d) follows from the
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fact that
H(W1,S1→[2:`+1]) +H(S→[2:`+1])
≥ H(W1, S→[2:`+1]) +H(S1→[2:`+1]) (3.37)
due to the submodularity of the entropy function; (e) follows from the fact that
Tk,d,`+1`
−1 + (d− Tk,d,`) `−1 = 1;
and (f) follows from the facts that
H(W1, S→[2:`+1]) ≥ H(W1, S→[2:`+1]) = H(L1,`+1) (3.38)
H(S→[1:`]) = H(W1, S→[1:`])
≥ H(W1, S→[2:`]) = H(L1,`). (3.39)
Applying (3.32) with (t, j,m) = (1, ` + 1, `) and (t, j,m) = (1, `, `), respectively
gives:
H(L1,`+1) + Tk,d,`+1`
−1H(S1→[2:`+1]) ≥ H(L1,k) (3.40)
H(L1,`) + Tk,d,`+1`
−1H(S1→[2:`+1]) ≥ H(L1,k). (3.41)
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Substituting (3.40) and (3.41) into (3.35) gives:
Tk,d,`α + dH(S→[1:`]) ≥ dH(L1,k)
(a)
= dH(L1,k,W[2:k], S→[2:k]) = dH(W[1:k], S→[2:k])
(b)
= dH(W[1:k],M, S→[2:k]) ≥ dH(M, S→[2:`+1])
= dH(S→[2:`+1]) + dH(M|S→[2:`+1])
(c)
= dH(S→[2:`+1]) + dH(M)
(d)
= dH(S→[1:`]) + dB
where (a) follows from the fact that (W[2:k], S→[2:k]) is a function of L1,k by Lemma 1; (b)
follows from the fact that M is a function of W[1:k] due to the message-recover constraint
(3.2); (c) follows from the repair-secrecy constraint (3.4); and (d) follows again from
(3.36) due to the symmetrical code that we consider. Canceling dH(S→[1:`]) from both
sides of the inequality completes the proof of (3.10) for the cases where Tk,d,` ≤ d.
Case 2: d ≤ Tk,d,` ≤ d +
√
d`. Note that if k = ` + 1, we have Tk,d,` = d − ` < d.
Therefore, in this case we must have k ≥ `+ 2 ≥ 3. In addition, let
q := 1 + (d− `)T−1k,d,`+1
and we have
d− (Tk,d,` − d) q
= T−1k,d,`+1
(−T 2k,d,` + 2dTk,d,` − d(d− `)) ≥ 0.
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It follows that
Tk,d,`α + dH(S→[1:`])
= d
(
α +H(S→[1:`])
)
+ (Tk,d,` − d)α
(a)
= d
(
α +H(S→[2:`+1])
)
+ (Tk,d,` − d)α
(b)
≥ d (H(W1) +H(S→[2:`+1]))+ (Tk,d,` − d)α
(c)
= d
(
H(W1, S1→[2:`+1]) +H(S→[2:`+1])
)
+ (Tk,d,` − d)α
(d)
≥ d (H(W1, S→[2:`+1]) +H(S1→[2:`+1]))+ (Tk,d,` − d)α
(e)
≥ d (H(L1,`+1) +H(S1→[2:`+1]))+ (Tk,d,` − d)α
= (d− (Tk,d,` − d) q)H(L1,`+1)
+ (Tk,d,` − d) (qH(L1,`+1) + α) + dH(S1→[2:`+1]) (3.42)
where (a) follows from (3.36) due to the symmetrical code that we consider; (b) is due
to the storage-capacity constraint H(W1) ≤ α; (c) is due to the fact that S1→[2:`+1] is a
function of W1; (d) follows from (3.37) due to the submodularity of the entropy function;
and (e) follows from (3.38).
The first term on the right-hand side of (3.42) can be further bounded from below by
the fact that L2,`+1 is a function of L1,`+1 by Lemma 1, so we have
H(L1,`+1) ≥ H(L2,`+1). (3.43)
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To bound from below the second term on the right-hand side of (3.42), note that
qH(L1,`+1) + α
= H(L1,`+1) + (d− `)T−1k,d,`+1H(L1,`+1) + α
(a)
= H(L1,`+1, S`+1→1) + (d− `)T−1k,d,`+1H(L1,`+1) + α
(b)
≥ H(L1,`, S`+1→1) + (d− `)T−1k,d,`+1H(L1,k) + α
(c)
≥ H(L1,`, S`+1→1) + (d− `)T−1k,d,`+1H(L1,k) +H(W`+1)
(d)
= H(L1,`, S`+1→1) +H(W`+1, S`+1→[1:`])+
(d− `)T−1k,d,`+1H(L1,k)
(e)
≥ H(L1,`,W`+1, S`+1→1) +H(S`+1→[1:`])+
(d− `)T−1d,`+1,kH(L1,k)
(f)
= H(L1,`,W`+1) +H(S`+1→[1:`]) + (d− l)T−1k,d,l+1H(L1,k)
(g)
= H(L2,`+1) +H(S1→[2:`+1]) + (d− `)T−1k,d,`+1H(L1,k)
(h)
≥ H(L2,`+1) +H(S1→[2:`+1]) + (d− `)T−1k,d,`+1H(L2,k) (3.44)
where (a) follows from the fact that S`+1→1 is a function of W`+1, which is in turn a
function of L1,`+1 by Lemma 1; (b) follows from (3.34) with (j,m) = (`+ 1, `+ 1); (c) is
due to the storage-capacity constraintH(W`+1) ≤ α; (d) follows from the fact that S`+1→1
is a function of W`+1; (e) follows from the fact that
H(L1,`,S`+1→1) +H(W`+1, S`+1→[1:`])
≥ H(L1,`,W`+1, S`+1→1) +H(S`+1→[1:`]) (3.45)
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due to the submodularity of the entropy function; (f) follows yet again from the fact that
S`+1→1 is a function of W`+1; (g) follows from the facts that
H(L1,`,W`+1) = H(L2,`+1) (3.46)
H(S`+1→[1:`]) = H(S1→[2:`+1]) (3.47)
due to the symmetrical code that we consider; and (h) follows from the fact that L2,k is a
function of L1,k by Lemma 1, so we have
H(L1,k) ≥ H(L2,k). (3.48)
Substituting (3.43) and (3.44) into (3.42) gives:
Tk,d,`α + dH(S→[1:`])
≥ (d− (Tk,d,` − d)(d− `)T−1k,d,`+1)H(L2,`+1)+
Tk,d,`H(S1→[2:`+1]) + (Tk,d,` − d) (d− `)T−1k,d,`+1H(L2,k)
(a)
= Tk,d,`T
−1
k,d,`+1`
(
H(L2,`+1) + Tk,d,`+1`
−1H(S1→[2:`+1]
)
+
(Tk,d,` − d) (d− `)T−1k,d,`+1H(L2,k)
(b)
≥ (Tk,d,`T−1k,d,`+1`+ (Tk,d,` − d)(d− `)T−1k,d,`+1)H(L2,k)
(c)
= dH(L2,k)
(d)
= dH(L2,k,W[3:k], S→[3:k])
= dH(W[1:k], S→[3:k])
(e)
= dH(W[1:k],M, S→[3:k])
≥ dH(M, S→[3:`+2]) = dH(S→[3:`+2]) + dH(M|S→[3:`+2])
(f)
= dH(S→[3:`+2]) + dH(M)
(g)
= dH(S→[1:`]) + dB
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where (a) and (c) follow from the fact that
d− (Tk,d,` − d)(d− `)T−1k,d,`+1 = Tk,d,`T−1k,d,`+1`;
(b) follows from (3.32) with (t, j,m) = (2, ` + 1, l); (d) follows from the fact that
(W[3:k], S→[3:k]) is a function of L2,k by Lemma 1; (e) follows from the fact that M is a
function of W[1:k] due to the message-recover constraint (3.2); (f) is due to the secrecy
constraint (3.4); and (g) follows from the fact that
H(S→[3:`+2]) = H(S→[1:`]) (3.49)
due to the symmetrical code that we consider. Canceling dH(S→[1:`]) from both sides of
the inequality completes the proof of (3.10) for d ≤ Tk,d,` ≤ d+
√
d`.
3.5.2 Proof of Theorem 4
Assume that k = d = n − 1 and ` = 1. As before, we shall also assume without loss
of generality that the codes that we consider here are symmetrical ones.
Let us first show that for any i ∈ [1 : n− 1], we have
H(S→1) ≥ H(S→i|W[1:i−1]) +H(S→i) (3.50)
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which can be seen as follows:
H(W[1:i−1]) +H(S→1)
(a)
= H(W[1:i−1]) +H(S→i)
(b)
= H(W[1:i−1], S→i) +H(S→i, S→i)
(c)
≥ H(W[1:i−1], S→i, S→i) +H(S→i)
≥ H(W[1:i−1], S→i) +H(S→i)
≥ H(W[1:i−1]) +H(S→i|W[1:i−1]) +H(S→i)
where (a) follows from the fact that H(S→1) = H(S→i) due to the symmetrical code that
we consider; (b) is due to the fact that S→i is a function of W[1:i−1]; and (c) is due to the
submodularity of the entropy function. Canceling H(W[1:i−1]) from both sides completes
the proof of (3.50).
Setting i = 2, 3 in (3.50) and by the symmetrical code that we consider, we have
H(S→1) ≥ H(S→2|W1) +H(S→2)
= H(S→2|W1) +H(S1→2)
= H(S→2|W1) +H(Sn→n−1)
= H(S→2|W1) +H(S→n−1)
≥ H(S→2|W1) +H(S→n−1|W[1:n−2]) (3.51)
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and
H(S→1) ≥ H(S→3|W[1:2]) +H(S→3)
= H(S→3|W[1:2]) +H(S[1:2]→3)
= H(S→3|W[1:2]) +H(S[n−1:n]→n−2)
= H(S→3|W[1:2]) +H(S→n−2)
≥ H(S→3|W[1:2]) +H(S→n−2|W[1:n−3]). (3.52)
Adding (3.51) and (3.52) gives:
3H(S→1)
≥ H(S→1) +H(S→2|W1) +H(S→3|W[1:2])+
H(S→n−2|W[1:n−3]) +H(S→n−1|W[1:n−2]). (3.53)
Furthermore, by the repair-bandwidth constraint, we have
(n− 1)(n− 6)
2
β =
n−4∑
i=3
iβ ≥
n−4∑
i=3
H(S→n−i)
≥
n−4∑
i=3
H(S→n−i|W[1:n−i−1]). (3.54)
Adding (3.53) and (3.54) gives:
(n− 1)(n− 6)
2
β + 3H(S→1)
≥
n−1∑
i=1
H(S→n−i|W[1:n−i−1]) =
n−1∑
i=1
H(S→i|W[1:i−1]) (3.55)
where the last equality follows from the change of variable i→ n− i.
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To proceed, we shall need the following lemma, whose proof can be found in the
Appendix.
Lemma 4. For any symmetrical (n, k = n−1, d = n−1, N,K, T, S) code that satisfies the
node-regeneration requirement (3.3) and the repair-secrecy constraint (3.4) with ` = 1,
we have
n−1∑
i=1
H(S→i|W[1:i−1]) + nα ≥ 3H(S→1) + 3B. (3.56)
Adding (3.55) and (3.56) gives:
(n− 1)(n− 6)
2
β + nα + 3H(S→1) ≥ 3H(S→1) + 3B.
Canceling 3H(S→1) from both sides and normalizing the remaining terms by B complete
the proof of (3.14).
3.5.3 Proof of Theorem 5
Let us first show that
3H(S→1) ≥
6∑
i=2
H(S→i|W[1:i−1]) +H(S→4) (3.57)
which can be seen as follows.
First note that
H(S→1)
(a)
≥ H(S→2|W1) +H(S1→2)
(b)
= H(S→2|W1) +H(S7→6)
= H(S→2|W1) +H(S→6)
≥ H(S→2|W1) +H(S→6|W[1:5]) (3.58)
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where (a) follows from (3.50) with n = 7 and i = 2; and (b) follows from the fact that
H(S1→2) = H(S7→6) due to the symmetrical code that we consider. Next, we have
H(S→1)
(a)
≥ H(S→3|W[1:2]) +H(S→3)
= H(S→3|W[1:2]) +H(S[1:2]→3)
(b)
= H(S→3|W[1:2]) +H(S[6:7]→5)
= H(S→3|W[1:2]) +H(S→5)
≥ H(S→3|W[1:2]) +H(S→5|W[1:4]) (3.59)
where (a) follows from (3.50) with n = 7 and i = 3; and (b) follows from the fact that
H(S[1:2]→3) = H(S[6:7]→5) due to the symmetrical code that we consider. Finally, setting
n = 7 and i = 4 in (3.50) gives
H(S→1) ≥ H(S→4|W[1:3]) +H(S→4). (3.60)
Adding (3.58)–(3.60) completes the proof of (3.57).
To proceed, we shall consider the cases where α ≥ H(S[2:4]→1) and α ≤ H(S[2:4]→1),
separately.
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Case 1: α ≥ H(S[2:4]→1). In this case, we have
8α + 3H(S→1)
≥ 7α + 3H(S→1) +H(S[2:4]→1)
(a)
≥ 7α +
6∑
i=2
H(S→i|W[1:i−1]) +H(S→4) +H(S[2:4]→1)
= 7α +
6∑
i=2
H(S→i|W[1:i−1]) +H(S[1:3]→4) +H(S[2:4]→1)
(b)
= 7α +
6∑
i=2
H(S→i|W[1:i−1]) +H(S[5:7]→1) +H(S[2:4]→1)
≥ 7α +
6∑
i=2
H(S→i|W[1:i−1]) +H(S→1)
= 7α +
6∑
i=1
H(S→i|W[1:i−1])
(c)
≥ 3H(S→1) + 3B
where (a) follows from (3.57); (b) follows from the fact that H(S[1:3]→4) = H(S[5:7]→1)
due to the symmetrical code that we consider; and (c) follows from Lemma 4 with n = 7.
Canceling 3H(S→1) from both sides and normalizing the remaining terms by B complete
the proof of (3.15) for the cases where α ≥ H(S[2:4]→1).
Case 2: α ≤ H(S[2:4]→1). Note that in this case, by node-capacity constraint and the
symmetry of the code that we consider, we have
H(W1) ≤ α ≤ H(S[2:4]→1) = H(S[1:3]→4) = H(S→4). (3.61)
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It follows that
6∑
i=2
H(S→i|W[1:i−1]) +H(S→4)−H(W[1:6])
=
6∑
i=2
(
H(S→i|W[1:i−1])−H(Wi|W[1:i−1])
)
+ (H(S→4)−H(W1))
(a)
≥
6∑
i=2
(
H(S→i|W[1:i−1])−H(Wi|W[1:i−1])
)
(b)
=
6∑
i=2
(
H(S→i,Wi|W[1:i−1])−H(Wi|W[1:i−1])
)
=
6∑
i=2
H(S→i|W[1:i])
≥
5∑
i=2
H(S→i|W[1:i])
=
5∑
i=2
H(S[i+1:7]→i|W[1:i])
≥
5∑
i=2
H(S[i+1:6]→i|W[1:i])
=
5∑
i=2
6∑
j=i+1
H(Sj→i|W[1:i], S[i+1:j−1]→i)
(c)
≥
5∑
i=2
6∑
j=i+1
H(Sj→i|W[1:j−1])
=
6∑
j=3
j−1∑
i=2
H(Sj→i|W[1:j−1])
≥
6∑
j=3
H(Sj→[2:j−1]|W[1:j−1])
=
6∑
j=3
H(Sj→[2:j−1])−
6∑
j=3
I(Sj→[2:j−1];W[1:j−1])
(d)
≥
6∑
j=3
H(Sj→[2:j−1])−
6∑
j=3
I(Wj;W[1:j−1]) (3.62)
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where (a) follows from (3.61); (b) follows from the fact that Wi is a function of
(S→i,W[1:i−1]) = Li−1,i by Lemma 1; (c) follows from the fact that S[i+1:j−1]→i is a func-
tion of W[1:j−1]; and (d) follows from the fact that Sj→[2:j−1] is a function of Wj . Further
note that
6∑
j=3
H(Sj→[2:j−1]) + 2α
(a)
=
6∑
j=3
H(Sj+1→[3:j]) + 2α
=
7∑
j=4
H(Sj→[3:j−1]) + 2α ≥ H(S→[3:6]) + 2α
(b)
≥ H(S→[3:6]) +H(W1) +H(W2)
≥ H(S→[3:6],W[1:2]) = H(L2,6) (3.63)
where (a) follows from the fact thatH(Sj→[2:j−1]) = H(Sj+1→[3:j]) due to the symmetrical
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code that we consider; and (b) is due to the node-capacity constraint. We thus have
8α + 3H(S→1)
(a)
≥ 8α +
6∑
i=2
H(S→i|W[1:i−1]) +H(S→4)
(b)
≥ 8α +
6∑
j=3
H(Sj→[2:j−1]) +H(W[1:6])−
6∑
j=3
I(Wj;W[1:j−1])
(c)
≥ 6α +H(L2,6) +H(W[1:6])−
6∑
j=3
I(Wj;W[1:j−1])
(d)
≥
6∑
j=1
H(Wj) +H(L2,6) +H(W[1:6])−
6∑
j=3
I(Wj;W[1:j−1])
=
6∑
j=2
I(Wj;W[1:j−1]) +H(L2,6) + 2H(W[1:6])
−
6∑
j=3
I(Wj;W[1:j−1])
= I(W1;W2) +H(L2,6) + 2H(W[1:6])
≥ H(L2,6) + 2H(W[1:6])
(e)
≥ 3H(W[1:6]) (f)= 3H(W[1:7],M)
(g)
= 3H(W[1:7],M, S→1) ≥ 3H(M, S→1)
= 3H(S→1) + 3H(M|S→1) (h)= 3H(S→1) + 3H(M)
= 3H(S→1) + 3B
where (a) follows from (3.57); (b) follows from (3.62); (c) follows from (3.63); (d) fol-
lows from the node-capacity constraint; (e) follows from the fact thatH(L2,6) ≥ H(W[1:6])
due to Lemma 1; (f) follows from the facts that M is a function of W[1:6] due to the
message-recovery requirement (3.2) and that W7 is a function of S→7, which is in turn a
function of W[1:6]; (g) follows from the fact that S→1 is a function of W[2:7]; and (h) fol-
lows from the repair-secrecy constraint (3.4) with ` = 1. Canceling 3H(S→1) from both
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sides and normalizing the remaining terms by B complete the proof of (3.15) for the cases
where α ≥ H(S[2:4]→1).
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4. CODED CACHING
4.1 Introduction
The caching problem is an open problem in network coding. This system is proposed
to balance the usage of a network between its peak-traffic time and off-peak time: each
user receives messages from the central server and store in local cache in advance during
off-peak time in order to reduce the data transmission when the user requests some file
from the central server during the peak-traffic time.
More specifically, shown as in Figure 4.1, we have N files and K users in this system.
Each user has a local cache withM bits of memory size. This system works in two phases:
• caching phase: This phase is corresponding to the off-peak time of the network. In
this phase, without knowing any user’s request in the next phase in prior, the central
server send messages coded on all N files to each user individually. Thus differ-
ent users may get different messages in this phase. Each user stores the received
message into its local cache memory.
• broadcasting phase: This phase is corresponding to the peak-traffic time of the net-
Figure 4.1: The file recovery constraint for (4, 3, 3) secure exact-repair regenerating codes.
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work. In this phase, each user requests a file over all N files. By knowing all users’
requests, the central server broadcast an encoded message to all users. Thus all users
get a same message in this phase. Each user can decode the file requested by itself
according to its cache memory content and the broadcast message it received.
Our goal is to characterize the tradeoff region for all possible memory-capacity and
broadcast-rate pairs.
Maddah-Ali and Niesen [15] raised an inner bound for the caching problem in [15].
In their coding scheme, the inner bound can achieve K + 1 corner points, thus K linear
segments for an (N,K) caching system. Our conjecture is the optimality of this inner
bound. The main work in this paper is to prove the optimality of three segments of them.
4.2 Problem Formulation and the Maddah Ali-Niesen Conjecture
For given integerN andK, letWi, i = 1, 2, . . . , N beN independent random variables
and we have K total users, each of which has a cache. We claim a rate pair (M,R) is
achievable for a (N,K) caching system as long as
• for each k ∈ [K], we have a cache encoding function fi : [2F ]N ← [2bFMc];
• for each (d1, d2, . . . , dk) ∈ [N ]K , we have a message encoding function g(d1,d2,...,dK) :
[2F ]N ← [2bFRc];
• for each (d1, d2, . . . , dk), k ∈ [N ]K ×K, we have a user decoding function
µ(d1,d2,...,dk),k : [2
bFRc]× [2bFMc]← [2F ];
for some integer F , such that
• Wi uniformly distributed over
W = {1, 2, 3, . . . , 2F}, (4.1)
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thus Wi represent a file of F bits;
• encode all files (W1,W2, . . . ,WN) for all K cache, when k ∈ [K], we have
Zk = fk(W1,W2, . . . ,WN) (4.2)
as the k-th cache content;
• encode all files (W1,W2, . . . ,WN) under users’ demand, where (d1, d2, . . . , dk) ∈
[N ]K means the user k demand Wdk , we have
X(d1,d2,...,dk) = g(d1,d2,...,dk)(W1,W2, . . . ,WN) (4.3)
as the encoded message to broadcast to all users;
• for the k-th user, together with its cache contentZk and received messageX(d1,d2,...,dk),
it can decode
Wˆ(d1,d2,...,dk),k = µ(d1,d2,...,dk),k(X(d1,d2,...,dk), Zk) (4.4)
and Wˆ(d1,d2,...,dk),k = Wdk with 0 error.
We define R(N,K) as the collection of all achievable (M,R) rate pair for (N,K) caching
system.
In [15], Maddah-Ali and Niesen proposed a coding scheme for (N,K) cache system,
characterizing a inner bound for the tradeoff rate region between cache memory size M
and broadcasting transmission rate R.
Theorem 6 (Madda-Ali and Niesen Inner Bound). In a (N,K) cache system, where
N,K ∈ N and N ≥ K, for any M = N
K
r, r = 0, 1, . . . , K, pair (M,R(M)) is achievable
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where
R(M) = K(1− M
N
)
1
1 +KM/N
. (4.5)
This scheme gives K + 1 corner points, and hence we can achieve all points lying on
the segment bounded by any two corner points by time sharing algorithm, as well as the
points above those lines. As a corollary, we have
Corollary 5. In (N,K) cache system, any memory-rate pair (M,R) satisfying
K(K + 1)M + (K + 1− r)(K + 2− r)NR ≥ (K + r)(K + 1− r)N (4.6)
∀r = 1, 2, . . . , K is achievable.
We can see that Maddah-Ali and Niesen’s coding scheme gives an achievable rate
region bounded byK non-trivial linear segments for a (N,K) cache system. For example,
Figure.4.2 shows the memory-rate tradeoff region for N = 6 files and K = 3 users.
Points (0, 3), (2, 1), (4, 1/3) and (6, 0) are achieved by equation (4.5) with r = 0, 1, 2, 3
respectively. Convex hull of the achievable points gives us 3 linear segments.
Naturally, we will question the optimality of this coding scheme. In following parts, I
will show that some segments of this scheme is tight, thus the outer bound coincide with
the inner bound, when the number of files N is sufficiently large. Further more, with
the upcoming results, we can see that the memory-rate tradeoff region we presented in
Figure4.2 for (6, 3) cache system is tight. More than that, we can characterize the optimal
memory-rate tradeoff region for general N and K = 3.
In order to reduce ambiguity, we give order of segments from the bottom to the top
so that the order of segment consist with formula (4.6). That is to say, we will call the
segment as the i-th segment if it is the i-th segment counting from bottom to the top,
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Figure 4.2: Memory-rate tradeoff region for N = 6 files and K = 3 users. Blue curve
is obtained by formula (4.6). All area above the blue curve, including the blue curve, is
achievable.
moreover the formula of the i-th segment satisfies r = i in the form of (4.6). I will prove
the optimality of the first, second and the last segments in following sections respectively
in this paper.
4.3 Symmetries
Symmetry under permutation is one of the basic properties of the combinatorial ap-
proach. In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, symmetry property is applied, giving us freedom on
operating random variables and hence get the data structure we want. Similarly, the Sym-
metry property still exists in caching problem, however in caching problem the symmetry
is even more complex than what in regenerating codes problems. Formed in two parts, the
symmetry argument in caching is discovered and raised by Tian in [21].
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4.3.1 Symmetry in Users
Firstly we define a permutation function p˜i that
p˜i : [K]→ [K] (4.7)
as a permutation of user index. Correspondingly, the inverse permutation of p˜i is defined
as p˜i−1(·).
With p˜i and p˜i−1, we can define a function Π˜ such that
Π˜(Zk) = Zp˜i(k), k ∈ [K] (4.8)
Π˜(X(d1,d2,...,dK)) = X(dp˜i−1(1),dp˜i−1(2),...,dp˜i−1(K)) (4.9)
and for Z as a collection of Zk, X as a collection of X andW as a collection of Wi, we
define Π˜ as
Π˜(Z) = {Π˜(Zk) : Zk ∈ Z} (4.10)
Π˜(X ) = {Π˜(X) : X ∈ X} (4.11)
The symmetry in users means that without losing generality we can assume
H(W ,Z,X ) = H
(
W , Π˜(Z), Π˜(X )
)
(4.12)
4.3.2 Symmetry in Files
We define a permutation function pˆi that
pˆi : [N ]→ [N ] (4.13)
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as permutation of file index. We still use Z as a collection of Zk, X as a collection of X
andW as a collection of Wi. Based on pˆi, we define a function Πˆ that
Πˆ(Wi) = Wp˜i(i), i ∈ [N ] (4.14)
Πˆ(X(d1,d2,...,dK)) = X(dpˆi(1),dpˆi(2),...,dpˆi(K)) (4.15)
and
Πˆ(W) = {Πˆ(Wi) : Wi ∈ W} (4.16)
Πˆ(X ) = {Πˆ(X) : X ∈ X} (4.17)
The symmetry in files gives us that without losing generality we can assume
H(W ,Z,X ) = H
(
Πˆ(W),Z, Πˆ(X )
)
(4.18)
The detailed proof and argument of symmetry can be found in [21].
4.4 Optimality of the First Segment
Theorem 7 (Outer Bound for the First Segment). In a (N,K) cache system, any achiev-
able memory-rate pair (M,R) satisfies
M +NR ≥ N (4.19)
Proof. The proof of this segment is straightforward. For our convenience, we define
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X(i,i,...,i), a special type of X , as Xi, for i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Therefore we have
MF +NRF
≥H(Z1) +NH(X1) (4.20)
=H(Z1) +
N∑
i=1
H(Xi) (4.21)
≥H(Z1, X1, X2, . . . , XN) (4.22)
≥H(Z1,W1,W2, . . . ,WN) (4.23)
≥NF (4.24)
By canceling F from both side of inequality, we have
M +NR ≥ N (4.25)
as our first segment.
4.5 Optimality of the Second Segment
Before I prove the tightness of this segment, I need to define some notations for our
convenience. Let’s consider a type of transmitted message X which has a special form of
demanding: except the k-th user demanding Wj , every other user demand Wi. That is to
say, we focus on the type of message in the form of X(i,...,i,j,i,...,i), for i, j ∈ [N ].
Therefore for this kind of messages, we can distinguish each other by only 3 different
things: file index i as the index of file demanded by K − 1 users, file index j as the index
of file demanded by the special user and the node index k as the index of user who has
demand for j.
Hence, we can write all message in the form X(i,...,i,j,i,...,i) of as Xi,j,k for short without
any ambiguity. Furthermore, we use Xj,k short for X1,j,k. For a collection of this type of
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messages, we use X[j1:j2],k to denote Xj1,k, . . . , Xj2,k for some j2 ≥ j1 and X[j1:j2],[k1:k2] to
denote X[j1:j2],k1 , . . . , X[j1:j2],k2 for some k2 ≥ k1.
Also, I need to mention that, for those Xj,k and the collection of it that j 6∈ [N ] or
k 6∈ [K], then we regard it as an empty set.
In order to prove the optimality of the second segment, I will show that
Theorem 8 (Outer Bound for the Second Segment). In a (N,K) cache system where
N > K+1
2
, any achievable memory-rate pair (M,R) satisfies
K(K + 1)M +K(K − 1)NR ≥ (K + 2)(K − 1)N (4.26)
The formula (4.26) can be obtained by taking r = 2 in inequality (4.6), Corollary 5.
That is to say, Theorem 8 is a conversion of Corollary 5 when r = 2 particularly, and
hence it can prove the optimality of the bound obtained by (4.6) when r = 2. In the
proving Theorem 8, following lemmas play a very important role.
Lemma 6. For any (N,K) cache code, and with an integer p ≤ N , we have
H(Z1) + pH(X2,K) ≥ H(Z1,W[p]) + pH(Xp+1,K |Z1,W[p]) (4.27)
Lemma 6 says multiple messages can working with one user’s cache memory and
decode multiple files and the residue. The residue can still work with other users’ cache
memory, which will be shown in following.
62
Lemma 7. For any (N,K) cache code that K ≥ 2, we have
H(W[p], X[p+1:N ],[3:K]) + (K − 2)H(Z1,W[p])
+
(K − 2)(K − 3)
2
(N − p)H(Xp+1,K |Z1,W[p])
≥(K − 2)NF + pF (4.28)
Lemma 8. For any K ≥ 2
KH(Z1,W[p]) +
K(K − 1)
2
(N − p)H(Xp+1,K |Z1,W[p]) ≥ (K − 1)N + p (4.29)
Lemma 7 is used in proving Lemma 8, and we need Lemma 8 in proving Theorem 8.
These lemmas are proved in Appendix C. After introducing these important lemmas, now
we can prove Theorem 8.
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Proof. We write (K − 1)N = (K + 1)p+ q, where p, q ∈ N, q ≤ K. Therefore
K(K + 1)MF +K(K − 1)NRF
=K(K + 1)MF +K[(K + 1)p+ q]RF
=(K + 1− q)(KMF +KpRF )
+ q[KMF +K(p+ 1)RF ] (4.30)
≥(K + 1− q)[KH(Z1) +KpH(X2,K)
+ q[KH(Z1) +K(p+ 1)H(X2,K)] (4.31)
≥(K + 1− q)[KH(Z1,W[p]) +KpH(Xp+1,K |Z1,W[p])
+ q[KH(Z1,W[p+1]) +KpH(Xp+1,K |Z1,W[p]) +KH(Xp+2,K |Z1,W[p+1])] (4.32)
=(K + 1− q)KH(Z1,W[p]) + qKH(Z1,W[p+1])
+ [K(K + 1)pH(Xp+1,K |Z1,W[p]) + qKH(Xp+2,K |Z1,W[p+1])] (4.33)
(4.32) follows Lemma 6. In our definition, p and q are the quotient and remainder of
(K − 1)N divide (K + 1). If we take a close look on the item of [·] (4.33), we have
K(K + 1)pH(Xp+1,K |Z1,W[p]) + qKH(Xp+2,K |Z1,W[p+1])
≥(K + 1− q)K(K − 1)
2
(N − p)H(Xp+1,K |Z1,W[p])
+ q
K(K − 1)
2
(N − p− 1)H(Xp+2,K |Z1,W[p+1]) (4.34)
(4.34) holds as following:
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• The summation of the coefficients in both sides are equal as following:
(K + 1− q)K(K − 1)
2
(N − p) + qK(K − 1)
2
(N − p− 1)
=
K(K − 1)
2
[(K + 1− q)(N − p) + q(N − p)− q] (4.35)
=
K(K − 1)
2
[(K + 1)(N − p)− q] (4.36)
=
K(K − 1)
2
[(K + 1)(N − (K − 1)N − q
K + 1
)− q] (4.37)
=
K(K − 1)
2
[(K + 1)
2N + q
K + 1
− q] (4.38)
=
K(K − 1)
2
2N (4.39)
=K(K − 1)N (4.40)
=K(K + 1)p+Kq. (4.41)
• The coefficient of item H(Xp+2,K |Z1,W[p+1]) in the LHS is smaller than that in the
RHS that:
q
K(K − 1)
2
(N − p− 1) ≥ qK (4.42)
(4.42) follows
p ≤ K − 1
K + 1
N < N − 1, (4.43)
which can be derive from our definition that N > K+1
2
and p is an integer.
• For the items in the both sides, we have
H(Xp+2,K |Z1,W[p+1]) ≤ H(Xp+1,K |Z1,W[p]) (4.44)
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holds trivially.
Therefore, we can prove (4.34). Next, substituting (4.34) into (4.33) gives:
(K + 1− q)KH(Z1,W[p]) + qKH(Z1,W[p+1])
+ [K(K + 1)pH(Xp+1,K |Z1,W[p]) + qKH(Xp+2,K |Z1,W[p+1])]
≥(K + 1− q)[KH(Z1,W[p]) + K(K − 1)
2
(N − p)H(Xp+1,K |Z1,W[p]))
+ q[KH(Z1,W[p+1]) +
K(K − 1)
2
(N − p− 1)H(Xp+2,K |Z1,W[p+1])] (4.45)
(a)
≥(K + 1− q)[(K − 1)NF + pF ] + q[(K − 1)NF + (p+ 1)F ] (4.46)
=(K + 2)(K − 1)NF, (4.47)
where (a) follows Lemma 8. That is to say,
K(K + 1)MF +K(K − 1)NRF ≥ (K + 2)(K − 1)NF (4.48)
Hence Theorem 8 is proved by canceling F from both sides.
4.6 Optimality of the Last Segment
In this section, like what we do in last section, we also focus on some special type
of user demand and corresponding transmitted message. When N ≥ K(K+1)
2
, We denote
message X(j,k) (distinguish from Xj,k with extra (·) in the index) as
X(j,k) = X(1,2,...,k−1,j,k+1+(N−K),...,N), (4.49)
thus the first k − 1 users demand files with index 1 to k − 1, the last K − k users demand
files with index k + 1 + (N −K) to N , and the k-th user demand file with index j. For
physically meaningful, we have k ≤ j ≤ k + (N −K), else we regard it as ∅. We have
66
following outer bound:
Theorem 9 (Outer Bound for the Last Segment). In a (N,K) cache system, for any N ≥
K(K+1)
2
, all achievable (M,R) pairs satisfy:
K(K + 1)M + 2NR ≥ 2NK (4.50)
Following lemmas are essential in our proof:
Lemma 9. For k = 0, 1, . . . , K − 1, N ≥ K(K+1)
2
and i ∈ {k, k + 1, . . . , N − (K − k)},
1 ≤ A ≤ N − (K − k) + 1− i, we have
AH(X(i+1,k+1)|Z[k],W[i]) +H(Z[k+1],W[i])
≥AH(X(i+A+1,k+2)|Z[k+1],W[i+A]) +H(Z[k+1],W[i+A]). (4.51)
Lemma 10. For a (N,K) caching code, N ≥ K(K+1)
2
, K ≥ 2, all achievable (M,R) pair
satisfies
(K + 1)!MF + (K − 1)!2NRF
≥(K − 1)!
k
[(K(K + 1)− qk)H(Z[k],W[pk]) + qkH(Z[k],W[pk+1])]
+
(K − 1)!
k
[(2kN − qk)H(X(pk+1,k+1)|Z[k],W[pk])
+ qkH(X(pk+2,k+1)|Z[k],W[pk+1])]
+ (k − 1)(K − 1)!NF (4.52)
∀k ≤ K − 1, where integer pk and qk satisfy
k(k + 1)N = K(K + 1)pk + qk (4.53)
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and qk < K(K + 1).
Proof is organized in the following way: Lemma 9 is used to prove Lemma 10, and
Lemma 10 is the key to prove Theorem 9 . All detailed proofs are in appendix. Now we
can proceed to prove (4.50).
Proof. Firstly, Lemma 10 gives:
(K + 1)!MF + (K − 1)!2NRF
≥(K − 1)!
K − 1 [(K(K + 1)− qK−1)H(Z[K−1],W[pK−1]) + qK−1H(Z[K−1],W[pK−1+1])]
+
(K − 1)!
K − 1 [(2(K − 1)N − qK−1)H(X(pK−1+1,K)|Z[K−1],W[pK−1])
+ qK−1H(X(pK−1+2,K)|Z[K−1],W[pK−1+1])]
+ (K − 2)(K − 1)!NF (4.54)
by taking k = K − 1. For any p ≤ N , by Han’s Inequality we have
H(Z[K−1],W[p]) ≥ K − 1
K
H(Z[K],W[p]) +
1
K
H(W[p]) (4.55)
Substituting into (4.54) implies:
(K + 1)!MF + (K − 1)!2NRF
≥(K − 1)!
K
[(K(K + 1)− qK−1)H(Z[K],W[pK−1]) + qK−1H(Z[K],W[pK−1+1])]
+
(K − 1)!
K − 1
1
K
[(K(K + 1)− qK−1)H(W[pK−1]) + qK−1H(W[pK−1+1])]
+
(K − 1)!
K − 1 [(2(K − 1)N − qK−1)H(X(pK−1+1,K)|Z[K−1],W[pK−1])
+ qK−1H(X(pK−1+2,K)|Z[K−1],W[pK−1+1])]
+ (K − 2)(K − 1)!NF (4.56)
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In (4.56), since item H(W[pK−1]) ≥ pK−1F and H(W[pK−1+1]) ≥ (pK−1 + 1)F , therefore
we can simplify them as
(K − 1)!
K − 1
1
K
[(K(K + 1)− qK−1)H(W[pK−1]) + qK−1H(W[pK−1+1])]
≥(K − 1)!
K − 1
1
K
[(K(K + 1)− qK−1)pK−1 + qK−1(pK−1 + 1)]
=
(K − 1)!
K − 1
1
K
[K(K + 1)pK−1F + qK−1F ]
=
(K − 1)!
K − 1
1
K
K(K − 1)NF
=(K − 1)!NF (4.57)
Further more, we can lower bound some items in (4.56) as:
(K − 1)!
K − 1 [(2(K − 1)N − qK−1)H(X(pK−1+1,K)|Z[K−1],W[pK−1])
+ qK−1H(X(pK−1+2,K)|Z[K−1],W[pK−1+1])]
≥(K − 1)!
K
[(K(K + 1)− qK−1)H(X(pK−1+1,K)|Z[K−1],W[pK−1])
+K(K + 1)(pK − pK−1 − 1)H(X(pK−1+2,K)|Z[K−1],W[pK−1+1])] (4.58)
(4.58) holds according to following:
• The summation of the coefficients of both sides are equal, which is derived as fol-
lowing:
K(K + 1)− qK−1 +K(K + 1)(pK − pK−1 − 1)
=K(K + 1)− qK−1 +K(K + 1)N −K(K + 1)pK−1 −K(K + 1)
=2KN
=
K
K − 1[(2(K − 1)N − qK−1) + qK−1]. (4.59)
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• The coefficient of item H(X(pK−1+1,K)|Z[K−1],W[pK−1]) in the LHS is larger than
that in the RHS, which follows:
qK−1 ≤ K(K + 1) ≤ 2N ≤ 2N(K − 1)2 (4.60)
as our definition. Hence, equivalently we have:
1
K − 1(2(K − 1)N − qK−1) ≥
1
K
(K(K + 1)− qK−1) (4.61)
• Trivially we have
H(X(pK−1+1,K)|Z[K−1],W[pK−1]) ≥ H(X(pK−1+2,K)|Z[K−1],W[pK−1+1]) (4.62)
Therefore we have (4.57) proved. If we substitute (4.57) and (4.58) into (4.56), we
have:
(K + 1)!MF + (K − 1)!2NRF
≥(K − 1)!
K
[(K(K + 1)− qK−1)H(Z[K],W[pK−1]) + qK−1H(Z[K],W[pK−1+1])]
+
(K − 1)!
K
[(K(K + 1)− qK−1)H(X(pK−1+1,K)|Z[K−1],W[pK−1])
+K(K + 1)(pK − pK−1 − 1)H(X(pK−1+2,K)|Z[K−1],W[pK−1+1])]
+ (K − 2)(K − 1)!NF + (K − 1)!NF (4.63)
(a)
≥ (K − 1)!
K
K(K + 1)H(Z[K],W[pK−1]) + (K − 1)(K − 1)!NF (4.64)
≥(K − 1)!(K + 1)NF + (K − 1)!(K − 1)NF (4.65)
=(K − 1)!2NKF (4.66)
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where (a) follows Lemma 9 by taking A = pK − pK−1, i = pK−1 and A = pK − pK−1− 1
, i = pK−1 + 1 respectively.
By canceling F and (K − 1)! from both sides of (4.66), we have:
K(K + 1)M + 2NR ≥ 2NK (4.67)
Hence our Theorem 9 is proved.
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5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
• In this paper, we consider the (n, d) multilevel diversity coding with regeneration
problem, which is proposed in [16] firstly. We proved the MBR point can be
achieved by separate coding scheme. This proof includes proving two outer bounds.
The horizontal one is optimal and another one is not, and they intersect on the MBR
point.
There are several directions to proceed the research. The first is trying to get an opti-
mal outer bound for the segment left to the MBR point. The second is to understand
why mixing content can beat over the separate coding and how much it can do.
• In this paper, we considered the (n, k, d, `) secure exact-repair regenerating code
problem, which has been previously studied in [13,14,17–19]. We proved that when
the secrecy parameter ` is sufficiently large, the SRK point [19] is the only corner
point of the achievable normalized storage-capacity repair-bandwidth tradeoff re-
gion. This includes all previous results from [13] and [14] as special cases. On the
other hand, when ` is small, we showed that it is entirely possible that the achievable
normalized storage-capacity repair-bandwidth tradeoff region features multiple cor-
ner points. In particular, we showed that the achievable normalized storage-capacity
repair-bandwidth tradeoff region for the (7, 6, 6, 1) problem has exactly two corner
points. This suggests a much “smoother" transition, in terms of the rate region, from
the original exact-repair regenerating code problem to the secrecy extension than
that suggested by the previous results from [13] and [14].
The question whether (3.8) is also necessary for the SRK point [19] to be the only
corner point of the achievable normalized storage-capacity repair-bandwidth trade-
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off region remains open. Significant research is also needed to further understand
how the tradeoff region Rn,k,d,` may look like when ` is small (the non-secrecy
case with ` = 0 remains open and appears to be very challenging). In particular,
one may consider generalizing the code construction given in Section 3.4, which
was based on the so-called canonical layered codes proposed in [20] for the case
of k = d = n − 1. The canonical layered codes have been generalized to the
cases where d < n − 1 and k < d in [20], and further improvements can also
be found in [22]. Following the approach used in Section 3.4, the code construc-
tions from [20] and [22] can be similarly adapted into constructions that satisfy the
repair-secrecy requirement. The optimalities of these code constructions are cur-
rently under our investigations.
• In this paper we consider (N,K) coded caching problems. In [19], a conjecture was
proposed without proof. They think the optimal tradeoff region of an (N,K) coded
caching problem can be characterized by K linear segments. We proved the first,
the second and the last segments, counting from the bottom to the top.
The direction of future research is to prove the optimality of the segments in between
the second and last. To prove the third segment is a good starting point, and it is also
very important to find a combinatorial structure for this problem and to find the
physical meaning of which.
• Generally, in this paper we proposed a new approach on obtaining outer bounds for
variant network coding problems, and showed the effectiveness of this approach.
In many network coding problems, there’s a symmetry in the system, which makes
combinatorial approach possible. We showed how to find the physical meaning for
such symmetry we mentioned, hence to derive the combinatorial structure for each
problem specifically and apply our combinatorial approach.
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The directions of future research on combinatorial approach are following:
– applying combinatorial approach to more networking problems, getting the
combinatorial structure of which and understand the physical meaning of those
structures eventually and gradually.
– using combinatorial structure and argument to help computational approach
lowing the number of constraints, hence making computational approach prac-
tically available in more cases with larger parameter.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMAS FOR MULTILEVEL DIVERSITY CODING WITH
REGENERATION PROBLEM
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of Proposition 1. Our main tool for proving Proposition 1 is the following “ex-
change" lemma between L(j)0 and L
(k)
0 for j ≤ k.
Lemma 11 (Exchange lemma between L(j)0 and L
(k)
0 ). For any symmetrical (n = d +
1, d, (N1, . . . , Nd), T, S) multilevel diversity regenerating code that satisfies the repair re-
quirement (2.4), we have
d+ 1− j
d− k H(L
(k)
0 |M(k)) +H(L(j)0 |M(k))
≥ d+ 1− j
d− k H(L
(k+1)
0 |M(k)) +H(L(j−1)0 |M(k)) (A.1)
for any k ∈ [1 : d− 1] and j ∈ [1 : k]. Here, we use the convention that L(0)0 := ∅.
A proof of the lemma can be found in following section. Using this lemma, Propo-
sition 1 can be proved as follows. Fix k ∈ [1 : d − 1], add the inequalities (A.1) for
j ∈ [1 : k], and cancel the common term∑k−1j=1 H(L(j)0 |M(k)) on both sides. We have
Td,k
d− kH(L
(k)
0 |M(k)) +H(L(k)0 |M(k))
≥ Td,k
d− kH(L
(k+1)
0 |M(k)) +H(L(0)0 |M(k)),
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which can be equivalently written as
Td,k+1
d− k H(L
(k)
0 |M(k)) ≥
Td,k
d− kH(L
(k+1)
0 |M(k)), (A.2)
by the facts that H(L(0)0 |M(k)) = 0 and Td,k + (d− k) = Td,k+1. Multiplying both sides of
(A.2) by d− k and rearranging the terms complete the proof of (2.16).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof of Proposition 2. Our main tool for proving Proposition 2 is the following “ex-
change" lemma between L(j)0 and L
(k)
1 for j ≤ k.
Lemma 12 (Exchange lemma between L(j)0 and L
(k)
1 ). For any symmetrical (n = d +
1, d, (N1, . . . , Nd), T, S) multilevel diversity regenerating code that satisfies the repair re-
quirement (2.4), we have
d+ 1− j
d− k H(L
(k)
1 |M(k)) +H(L(j)0 |M(k))
≥ d+ 1− j
d− k H(L
(k+1)
1 |M(k)) +H(L(j−1)0 |M(k)) (A.3)
for any k ∈ [1 : d−1] and j ∈ [1 : k]. Here, we again follow the convention that L(0)0 := ∅.
A proof of the lemma can be found in the following section. Using this lemma, Propo-
sition 2 can be proved as follows. Fix k ∈ [1 : d − 1], add the inequalities (A.3) for
j ∈ [1 : k], and cancel the common term∑k−1j=1 H(L(j)0 |M(k)) on both sides. We have
Td,k
d− kH(L
(k)
1 |M(k)) +H(L(k)0 |M(k))
≥ Td,k
d− kH(L
(k+1)
1 |M(k)) +H(L(0)0 |M(k)),
which is equivalent to (2.19) by the fact that H(L(0)0 |M(k)) = 0. This completes the proof
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of (2.19).
A.3 Proof of Lemma 11
Proof of Lemma 11. Fix k ∈ [1 : d−1] and j ∈ [1 : k]. Since j ≤ k by the assumption,
we have d+ 1− j > d− k. Thus, we may write d+ 1− j = i(d− k) + p for some integer
i ≥ 1 and p ∈ [1 : d− k]. For any q ∈ [1 : i− 1], let
Bq := [j + p+(q − 1)(d− k) : j + p+ q(d− k)− 1].
Furthermore, let B0 := [j : j + p− 1]. Then we have [j : k] = ∪i−1q=0Bq. Next, let us show
by induction that
qH(L
(k)
0 |M(k)) +H(L(j)0 |M(k))
≥ qH(L(k+1)0 |M(k)) +H(S∪i−qr=0Br,k+1, L
(j−1)
0 |M(k)) (A.4)
for any q ∈ [1 : i].
To prove the base case of q = 1, note that
H(L
(j)
0 |M(k)) = H(Lj, L(j−1)0 |M(k))
= H(S[j+1:d+1],j, L
(j−1)
0 |M(k))
(a)
= H(S[j:k],k+1, S[k+2:d+1],k+1, L
(j−1)
0 |M(k))
= H(S[j:k],k+1, Lk+1, L
(j−1)
0 |M(k)),
where (a) follows by swapping j with k + 1 for the storage-node indices and the fact that
the collection of random variables from L(j−1)0 is invariant under such a swap. Further note
that S[j:k],k+1 is a function of {Ws : s ∈ [j : k]}, which is in turn a function of L(k)0 . It
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follows that
H(L
(k)
0 |M(k)) +H(L(j)0 |M(k))
= H(L
(k)
0 , S[j:k],k+1|M(k)) +H(S[j:k],k+1, Lk+1, L(j−1)0 |M(k))
(a)
≥ H(L(k)0 , S[j:k],k+1, Lk+1|M(k))
+H(S[j:k],k+1, L
(j−1)
0 |M(k)) (A.5)
(b)
= H(L
(k+1)
0 |M(k)) +H(S[j:k],k+1, L(j−1)0 |M(k))
= H(L
(k+1)
0 |M(k)) +H(S∪i−1r=0Br,k+1, L
(j−1)
0 |M(k)), (A.6)
where (a) follows from the submodularity of entropy, and (b) follows again from the fact
that S[j:k],k+1 is a function of L
(k)
0 . This completes the proof of the base case of q = 1.
Next, assuming (A.4) holds for some q ∈ [i− 1], we have
(q + 1)H(L
(k)
0 |M(k)) +H(L(j)0 |M(k)) ≥ qH(L(k+1)0 |M(k))
+H(S∪i−qr=0Br,k+1, L
(j−1)
0 |M(k)) +H(L(k)0 |M(k)). (A.7)
Consider a one-to-one swapping between the elements of Bi−q and [k + 2 : d + 1] for
the storage-node indices, and note that the collection of random variables from L(j−1)0 is
invariant under such swaps. We can write
H(S∪i−qr=0Br,k+1, L
(j−1)
0 |M(k))
= H(S∪i−(q+1)r=0 Br,k+1
, S[k+2:d+1],k+1, L
(j−1)
0 |M(k))
= H(S∪i−(q+1)r=0 Br,k+1
, Lk+1, L
(j−1)
0 |M(k)).
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It follows that
H(S∪i−qr=0Br,k+1, L
(j−1)
0 |M(k)) +H(L(k)0 |M(k))
= H(S∪i−(q+1)r=0 Br,k+1
, Lk+1, L
(j−1)
0 |M(k)) +H(L(k)0 |M(k))
(a)
= H(S∪i−(q+1)r=0 Br,k+1
, Lk+1, L
(j−1)
0 |M(k))+
H(L
(k)
0 , S∪i−(q+1)r=0 Br,k+1
|M(k))
(b)
≥ H(S⋃i−(q+1)
r=0 Br,k+1
, Lk+1, L
(k)
0 |M(k))+
H(S∪i−(q+1)r=0 Br,k+1
, L
(j−1)
0 |M(k))
(c)
= H(L
(k+1)
0 |M(k)) +H(S⋃i−(q+1)
r=0 Br,k+1
, L
(j−1)
0 |M(k)), (A.8)
where (a) and (c) are due to the fact that S∪i−(q+1)r=0 Br,k+1 is a function of L
(k)
0 , and (b)
follows from the submodularity of entropy. Substituting (A.8) into (A.7) gives
(q + 1)H(L
(k)
0 |M(k)) +H(L(j)0 |M(k))
≥ qH(L(k+1)0 |M(k))+(
H(L
(k+1)
0 |M(k)) +H(S∪i−(q+1)r=0 Br,k+1, L
(j−1)
0 |M(k))
)
= (q + 1)H(L
(k+1)
0 |M(k))+
H(S∪i−(q+1)r=0 Br,k+1
, L
(j−1)
0 |M(k)),
which completes the induction step and hence the proof of (A.4).
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Set q = i in (A.4). We have
iH(L
(k)
0 |M(k)) +H(L(j)0 |M(k))
≥ iH(L(k+1)0 |M(k)) +H(SB0,k+1, L(j−1)0 |M(k))
= iH(L
(k+1)
0 |M(k)) +H(L(j−1)0 |M(k))+
H(SB0,k+1|L(j−1)0 ,M(k)) (A.9)
where the last equality follows from the chain rule for conditional entropy. Consider a one-
to-one swapping between the elements of B0 = [j : j+ p− 1] and B := [k+ 2 : k+ p+ 1]
for the storage-node indices, and note the collection of random variables L(j−1)0 is invariant
under such swaps. We can write
H(SB0,k+1|L(j−1)0 ,M(k)) = H(SB,k+1|L(j−1)0 ,M(k)). (A.10)
Now consider two nonempty subsets B′ and B′′ of [k+2 : d+1] of the same cardinality
p. Consider a permutation pi on the storage-node indices such that: 1) only the indices in
[k+2 : d+1] are permuted; and 2) B′ are mapped to B′′. Note that the collection of random
variables from L(j−1) is invariant under such a permutation. Then by the symmetry of the
code, we haveH(SB′,k+1|L(j−1)0 ,M(k)) = H(SB′′,k+1|L(j−1)0 ,M(k)). It thus follows from the
well-known Han’s inequality [23] that
1
p
H(SB,k+1|L(j−1)0 ,M(k)) ≥
1
d− kH(Lk+1|L
(j−1)
0 ,M
(k)). (A.11)
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Substituting (A.11) into (A.10) gives:
H(SB0,k+1|L(j−1)0 ,M(k))
≥ p
d− kH(Lk+1|L
(j−1)
0 ,M
(k))
(a)
≥ p
d− kH(Lk+1|L
(k)
0 ,M
(k))
=
p
d− k
[
H(L
(k+1)
0 |M(k))−H(L(k)0 |M(k))
]
, (A.12)
where (a) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces entropy. Substituting (A.12) into
(A.9) gives:
(
i+
p
d− k
)
H(L
(k)
0 |M(k)) +H(L(j)0 |M(k))
≥
(
i+
p
d− k
)
H(L
(k+1)
0 |M(k)) +H(L(j−1)0 |M(k)),
which is equivalent to (A.1) by noting that
i+
p
d− k =
i(d− k) + p
d− k =
d+ 1− j
d− k .
This completes the proof of Lemma 11.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 12
Proof of Lemma 12. Fix k ∈ [1 : d−1] and j ∈ [1 : k]. Since j ≤ k by the assumption,
we have d+ 1− j > d− k. Thus, we may write d+ 1− j = i(d− k) + p for some integer
i ≥ 1 and p ∈ [1 : d− k]. For any q ∈ [1 : i− 1], let
Bq := [j + p+ (q − 1)(d− k) : j + p+ q(d− k)− 1].
Furthermore, let B0 := {1}∪ [j+1 : j+p−1]. Then we have {1}∪ [j+1 : k] = ∪i−1q=0Bq.
84
Next, let us show by induction that
qH(L
(k)
1 |M(k)) +H(L(j)0 |M(k))
≥ qH(L(k+1)1 |M(k)) +H(S∪i−qr=0Br,k+1, L
′
[2:j]|M(k)) (A.13)
for any q ∈ [1 : i], where L′[2:j] := {L[2:j], S1,[2:j]}.
To prove the base case of q = 1, note that
H(L
(j)
0 |M(k))
(a)
= H(S1,[2:j+1], L[2:j+1]|M(k))
= H(S1,j+1, Lj+1, L
′
[2:j]|M(k))
= H(S1,j+1, S[j+2:d+1],j+1, L
′
[2:j]|M(k))
(b)
= H(S1,k+1, S[j+1:k],k+1, S[k+2:d+1],k+1, L
′
[2:j]|M(k))
= H(S1,k+1, S[j+1:k],k+1, Lk+1, L
′
[2:j]|M(k)),
where (a) follows by swapping r with r + 1 for all r ∈ [1 : d] and d + 1 with 1 for the
storage-node indices, and (b) follows by swapping j + 1 with k + 1 for the storage-node
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indices. We thus have
H(L
(k)
1 |M(k)) +H(L(j)0 |M(k))
= H(W1, L[2:k]|M(k))+
H(S1,k+1, S[j+1:k],k+1, Lk+1, L
′
[2:j]|M(k))
(a)
= H(W1, L
′
[2:k], S1,k+1, S[j+1:k],k+1|M(k))+
H(S1,k+1, S[j+1:k],k+1, Lk+1, L
′
[2:j]|M(k))
(b)
≥ H(W1, L′[2:k], S1,k+1, S[j+1:k],k+1, Lk+1|M(k))+
H(S1,k+1, S[j+1:k],k+1, L
′
[2:j]|M(k))
(c)
= H(W1, L[2:k+1]|M(k))+
H(S1,k+1, S[j+1:k],k+1, L
′
[2:j]|M(k))
= H(L
(k+1)
1 |M(k)) +H(S∪i−1r=0Br,k+1, L
′
[2:j]|M(k)), (A.14)
where (a) and (c) follow from the facts that S1,[2:k+1] is a function ofW1 and that S[j+1:k],k+1
is a function of {Ws : s ∈ [j + 1 : k]}, which is in turn a function of {W1, L[2:k]}, and (b)
is due to the submodularity of entropy. This completes the proof of the base case of q = 1.
Assume that (A.13) holds for some q ∈ [1 : i− 1]. We have
(q + 1)H(L
(k)
1 |M(k)) +H(L(j)0 |M(k))
≥ qH(L(k+1)1 |M(k)) +H(S∪i−qr=0Br,k+1, L
′
[2:j]|M(k))+
H(L
(k)
1 |M(k)). (A.15)
Consider a one-to-one swapping between the elements of Bi−q and [k + 2 : d + 1] for
the storage-node indices, and note that the collection of random variables from L′[2:j] is
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invariant under such swaps. We have
H(S∪i−qr=0Br,k+1, L
′
[2:j]|M(k)) +H(L(k)1 |M(k))
= H(S∪i−(q+1)r=0 Br,k+1
, S[k+2:n],k+1, L
′
[2:j]|M(k))
+H(L
(k)
1 |M(k))
= H(S∪i−(q+1)r=0 Br,k+1
, Lk+1, L
′
[2:j]|M(k))
+H(W1, L[2:k]|M(k))
(a)
= H(S∪i−(q+1)r=0 Br,k+1
, Lk+1, L
′
[2:j]|M(k))
+H(W1, L
′
[2:k], S∪i−(q+1)r=0 Br,k+1
|M(k))
(b)
≥ H(W1, L′[2:k], S∪i−(q+1)r=0 Br,k+1, S[j+1:k],k+1, Lk+1|M
(k))
+H(S∪i−(q+1)r=0 Br,k+1
, L′[2:j]|M(k))
(c)
= H(L
(k+1)
1 |M(k)) +H(S∪i−(q+1)r=0 Br,k+1, L
′
[2:j]|M(k)), (A.16)
where (a) and (c) are true because S1,[2;k+1] is a function of W1 and that S∪i−(q+1)r=0 Br,k+1 is
a function of {Ws : s ∈ ∪i−(q+1)r=0 Br}, which is in turn a function of {W1, L[2:k]}, and (b) is
due to the submodularity of entropy. Substituting (A.16) into (A.15) gives
(q + 1)H(L
(k)
1 |M(k)) +H(L(j)0 |M(k))
≥ (q + 1)H(L(k+1)1 |M(k)) +H(S∪i−(q+1)r=0 Br,k+1, L
′
[2:j]|M(k)),
which completes the induction step and hence the proof of (A.13).
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Set q = i in (A.13). We have
iH(L
(k)
1 |M(k)) +H(L(j)0 |M(k))
≥ iH(L(k+1)1 |M(k)) +H(SB0,k+1, L′[2:j]|M(k))
(a)
= iH(L
(k+1)
1 |M(k)) +H(L′[2:j]|M(k))+
H(SB0,k+1|L′[2:j],M(k))
(b)
= iH(L
(k+1)
1 |M(k)) +H(L(j−1)0 |M(k))+
H(SB0,k+1|L′[2:j],M(k)), (A.17)
where (a) follows from the chain rule for conditional entropy, and (b) follows by swapping
r with r + 1 for r ∈ [1 : d] and d + 1 with 1 for the storage-node indices. Consider
a one-to-one swapping between the elements of B0 = {1}
⋃
[j + 1 : j + p − 1] and
B := [k + 2 : k + p + 1] for the storage-node indices, and note the collection of random
variables from L′[2:j] is invariant under such swaps. We can write
H(Sτ0,k+1|L′[2:j],M(k)) = H(SB,k+1|L′[2:j],M(k)) (A.18)
Now consider two nonempty subsets B′ and B′′ of [k+2 : d+1] of the same cardinality
p. Consider a permutation pi on the storage-node indices such that: 1) only the indices in
[k + 2 : d + 1] are permuted; and 2) B′ are mapped to B′′. Note that the collection of
random variables from L′[2:j] is invariant under such a permutation. Then by the symmetry
of the code, we haveH(SB′,k+1|L′[2:j],M(k)) = H(SB′′,k+1|L′[2:j],M(k)). It thus follows from
the well-known Han’s inequality [23] that
1
p
H(SB,k+1|L′[2:j],M(k)) ≥
1
d− kH(Lk+1|L
′
[2:j],M
(k)). (A.19)
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Substituting (A.19) into (A.18) gives:
H(Sτ0,k+1|L′[2:j],M(k))
≥ p
d− kH(Lk+1|L
′
[2:j],M
(k))
(a)
≥ p
d− kH(Lk+1|L
(k)
1 , L
′
[2:j],M
(k))
(b)
=
p
d− kH(Lk+1|L
(k)
1 ,M
(k))
=
p
d− k
[
H(L
(k+1)
1 |M(k))−H(L(k)1 |M(k))
]
, (A.20)
where (a) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces entropy, and (b) is because L′[2:j]
is a function of L(k)1 . Substituting (A.20) into (A.17) gives:
(
i+
p
d− k
)
H(L
(k)
1 |M(k)) +H(L(j)0 |M(k))
≥
(
i+
p
d− k
)
H(L
(k+1)
1 |M(k)) +H(L(j−1)0 |M(k)),
which is equivalent to (A.3) by noting that
i+
p
d− k =
i(d− k) + p
d− k =
d+ 1− j
d− k .
This completes the proof of Lemma 12.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THE LEMMAS FOR SECURE REGENERATING CODE
B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Proof of Lemma 1. Fix s ∈ [1 : n] and t ∈ [0 : s − 1]. Let us first note that S→t+1
is a function of W[1:t]. As a result, S→t+1 = (S→t+1, S→t+1) is a function of Lt,s. It thus
follows immediately from the node-regeneration requirement (3.3) that Wt+1 is a function
of Lt,s. Similarly and inductively, it can be shown that (S→j,Wj) is a function of Lt,s for
all j ∈ [t+ 2 : s] as well. This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. To prove (3.31), let us fix t ∈ [1 : 2], r ∈ [2 : k − 1], p ∈ [1 : r − t + 1], and
q ∈ [0 : d− r − 1]. We have
H(S1→[2:p+1]) +H(Lt,r, S[r+2:r+q+1]→r+1)
(a)
= H(Sr+q+2→[r−p+2:r+1]) +H(Lt,r, S[r+2:r+q+1]→r+1)
(b)
≥ H(Sr+q+2→[r−p+2:r]) +H(Lt,r, S[r+2:r+q+2]→r+1)
(c)
= H(S1→[2:p]) +H(Lt,r, S[r+2:r+q+2]→r+1)
where (a) follows from the fact that H(S1→[2:p+1]) = H(Sr+q+2→[r−p+2:r+1]) due to the
symmetrical codes that we consider; (b) follows from the submodularity of the entropy
function; and (c) follows from the fact that H(Sr+q+2→[r−p+2:r]) = H(S1→[2:p]) again due
to the symmetrical codes that we consider. This completes the proof of (3.31) for any
r ∈ [2 : k − 1], p ∈ [1 : r − t+ 1], and q ∈ [0 : d− r − 1].
To prove (3.32), let us fix t ∈ [1 : 2], j ∈ [2 : k], and m ∈ [1 : j − t + 1]. Notice
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that (3.32) holds trivially with equality when j = k, so we only need to consider the cases
where j ∈ [2 : k − 1] for k ≥ 3. (When k = 2, [2 : k − 1] is empty and there is nothing to
prove.) Now adding (3.31) for q ∈ [0 : d− r − 1] gives:
(d− r)H(S1→[2:p+1]) +
d−r−1∑
q=0
H(Lt,r, S[r+2:r+q+1]→r+1)
≥ (d− r)H(S1→[2:p]) +
d−r−1∑
q=0
H(Lt,r, S[r+2:r+q+2]→r+1).
Canceling
∑d−r−1
q=1 H(Lt,r, S[r+2:r+q+1]→r+1) from both sides of the above inequality gives:
(d− r)H(S1→[2:p+1]) +H(Lt,r)
≥ (d− r)H(S1→[2:p]) +H(Lt,r, S[r+2:n]→r+1)
= (d− r)H(S1→[2:p]) +H(Lt,r+1) (B.1)
for any r ∈ [2 : k − 1] and p ∈ [1 : r − t + 1]. Adding (B.1) for r ∈ [j : k − 1] and
p ∈ [1 : m] gives:
Tk,d,j
m∑
p=1
H(S1→[2:p+1]) +m
k−1∑
r=j
H(Lt,r)
≥ Tk,d,j
m∑
p=1
H(S1→[2:p]) +m
k−1∑
r=j
H(Lt,r+1).
Canceling Tk,d,j
∑m
p=2H(S1→[2:p]) + m
∑k−1
r=j+1H(Lt,r) from both sides of the above in-
equality gives:
Tk,d,jH(S1→[2:m+1]) +mH(Lt,j) ≥ mH(Lt,k).
Dividing both sides by m completes the proof of (3.32) for any t ∈ [1 : 2], j ∈ [2 : k], and
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m ∈ [1 : j − t+ 1]. This completes the proof of Lemma ??.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. To prove (3.33), let us fix j ∈ [2 : k−1] and t ∈ [j : k−1]. Let n−j = u(d−t)+p
for some positive integers u and p ∈ [1 : d− t]. Let
τ0 := {1} ∪ [j + 1 : j + p− 1] (B.2)
and
τq := [j + p+ (q − 1)(d− t) : j + p+ q(d− t)− 1] (B.3)
for q ∈ [1 : u− 1]. Notice that we have
∪u−1q=0τq = {1} ∪ [j + 1 : t]. (B.4)
By the symmetry of the codes that we consider, we have
H(Sτ0→t+1|W2, S→[3:j], St+1,2)
= H(SB→t+1|W2, S→[3:j], St+1,2) (B.5)
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for any B ⊆ [t+ 2 : n] such that |B| = |τ0| = p. It follows that
H(Sτ0→t+1|W2, S→[3:j], St+1→2)
(a)
≥ p
d− tH(S[t+2:n]→t+1|W2, S→[3:j], St+1→2)
=
p
d− tH(S[t+2:n]→t+1|W2, S→[3:j], S→[3:j], St+1→2)
(b)
≥ p
d− tH(S[t+2:n]→t+1|W2, S→[3:j], L1,t)
(c)
=
p
d− tH(S[t+2:n]→t+1|L1,t)
=
p
d− t
(
H(S[t+2:n]→t+1, L1,t)−H(L1,t)
)
=
p
d− t (H(L1,t+1)−H(L1,t)) (B.6)
where (a) follows from the well-known Han’s inequality [23]; (b) follows from the facts
that (S→[3:j], St+1→2) is a sub-collection of random variables from L1,t and that condition-
ing reduces entropy; and (c) follows from the fact that (W2, S→[3:j]) is a function of L1,t by
Lemma 1.
Next, let us show, by induction, that
rH(L1,t) +H(L1,j, Sj→1)
≥ rH(L1,t+1) +H(W2, S→[3:j], S∪u−rq=0 τq→t+1, St+1→2) (B.7)
for any r ∈ [1 : u].
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For the base case where r = 1, we have
H(L1,t) +H(L1,j, Sj→1)
(a)
= H(L1,t,W2, S→[2:j], S∪u−1q=0 τq→t+1) +H(L1,j, Sj→1)
(b)
= H(L1,t,W2, S→[2:j], S∪u−1q=0 τq→t+1)
+H(L1,j, S→[2:j−1], Sj→1)
= H(W[1:2], S→[2:j], S→[j+1:t], S∪u−1q=0 τq→t+1)
+H(W1, S→[2:j−1], S→j, Sj→1)
(c)
= H(W[1:2], S→[2:j], S→[j+1:t], S∪u−1q=0 τq→t+1)
+H(W2, S→[3:j], S∪u−1q=0 τq→t+1, S→t+1, St+1→2)
(d)
≥ H(W[1:2], S→[2:j], S→[j+1:t+1], S∪u−1q=0 τq→t+1)
+H(W2, S→[3:j], S∪u−1q=0 τq→t+1, St+1→2)
= H(L1,t+1,W2, S→[2:j], S∪u−1q=0 τq→t+1)
+H(W2, S→[3:j], S∪u−1q=0 τq→t+1, St+1→2)
(e)
= H(L1,t+1) +H(W2, S→[3:j], S∪u−1q=0 τq→t+1, St+1→2)
where (a) and (e) follow from the fact that (W2, S→[2:j], S∪u−rq=0 τq→t+1) is a function of L1,t
by Lemma 1; (b) follows from the fact that S→[2:j] is a function of L1,j by Lemma 1; and
(c) follows from the fact that
H(W1, S→[2:j−1], S→j, Sj→1)
= H(W2, S→[3:j], S∪u−1q=0 τq→t+1, S→t+1, St+1→2) (B.8)
due to the symmetrical codes that we consider; and (d) follows from the submodularity of
the entropy function. This completes the proof of the base case.
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Now assume that (B.7) holds for some r ∈ [1 : u − 1]. Similar to the base case, we
have
H(L1,t) +H(W2, S→[3:j], S∪u−rq=0 τq→t+1, St+1→2)
(a)
= H(L1,t,W2, S→[2:j], S∪u−(r+1)q=0 τq→t+1
)
+H(W2, S→[3:j], S∪u−rq=0 τq→t+1, St+1→2)
= H(W[1:2], S→[2:j], S→[j+1:t], S∪u−(r+1)q=0 τq→t+1
)
+H(W2, S→[3:j], S∪u−rq=0 τq→t+1, St+1→2)
(b)
= H(W[1:2], S→[2:j], S→[j+1:t], S∪u−(r+1)q=0 τq→t+1
)
+H(W2, S→[3:j], S∪u−(r+1)q=0 τq→t+1
, S→t+1, St+1→2)
(c)
≥ H(W[1:2], S→[2:j], S→[j+1:t+1], S∪u−(r+1)q=0 τq→t+1)
+H(W2, S→[3:j], S∪u−(r+1)q=0 τq→t+1
, St+1→2)
= H(L1,t+1,W2, S→[2:j], S∪u−(r+1)q=0 τq→t+1
)
+H(W2, S→[3:j], S∪u−(r+1)q=0 τq→t+1
, St+1→2)
(d)
= H(L1,t+1) +H(W2, S→[3:j], S∪u−(r+1)q=0 τq→t+1
, St+1→2) (B.9)
where (a) and (d) follow from the fact that (W2, S→[2:j], S∪u−(r+1)q=0 τq→t+1) is a function of
L1,t+1 by Lemma 1; (b) follows from the fact that
H(W2, S→[3:j], S∪u−rq=0 τq→t+1, St+1→2)
= H(W2, S→[3:j], S∪u−(r+1)q=0 τq→t+1
, S→t+1, St+1→2) (B.10)
due to the symmetrical codes that we consider; and (c) follows from the submodularity of
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the entropy function. Adding (B.7) and (B.9) gives
(r+1)H(L1,t) +H(L1,j, Sj→1)
≥ (r + 1)H(L1,t+1)
+H(W2, S→[3:j], S∪u−(r+1)q=0 τq→t+1
, St+1→2).
This completes the proof of the induction step.
Finally, setting r = u in (B.7) gives:
uH(L1,t) +H(L1,j, Sj→1)
≥ uH(L1,t+1) +H(W2, S→[3:j], Sτ0→t+1, St+1→2)
= uH(L1,t+1) +H(W2, S→[3:j], St+1→2)
+H(Sτ0→t+1|W2, S→[3:j], St+1→2). (B.11)
Substituting (B.6) into (B.11) and using the fact that
u+
p
d− t =
u(d− t) + p
d− t =
n− j
d− t (B.12)
we have
n− j
d− t H(L1,t) +H(L1,j, Sj→1)
≥ n− j
d− t H(L1,t+1) +H(W2, S→[3:j], St+1→2). (B.13)
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Finally, due to the symmetrical codes that we consider, we have
H(W2, S→[3:j], St+1→2)
= H(W1, S→[2:j−1], Sj→1)
= H(W1, S→[2:j−1], S→[2:j−1], Sj→1)
= H(L1,j−1, S→[2:j−1], Sj→1)
= H(L1,j−1, Sj→1) (B.14)
where the last equality follows from the fact that S→[2:j−1] is a function of L1,j−1 by
Lemma 1. Substituting (B.14) into (B.13) completes the proof of (3.33) for any j ∈ [2 :
k − 1] and t ∈ [j : k − 1].
B.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. First note that
n−1∑
i=1
H(S→i|W[1:i−1])
(a)
=
n−1∑
i=1
H(S→i,Wi|W[1:i−1])
=
n−1∑
i=1
H(S→i|W[1:i]) +
n−1∑
i=1
H(Wi|W[1:i−1])
=
n−1∑
i=1
H(S→i|W[1:i]) +H(W[1:n−1])
=
n−1∑
i=1
H(S[i+1:n]→i|W[1:i]) +H(W[1:n−1])
=
n−1∑
i=1
n∑
j=i+1
H(Sj→i|W[1:i], S[i+1;j−1]→i) +H(W[1:n−1])
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(b)
≥
n−1∑
i=1
n∑
j=i+1
H(Sj→i|W[1:j−1]) +H(W[1:n−1])
=
n∑
j=2
j−1∑
i=1
H(Sj→i|W[1:j−1]) +H(W[1:n−1])
≥
n−1∑
j=2
j−1∑
i=1
H(Sj→i|W[1:j−1]) +H(W[1:n−1])
≥
n−1∑
j=2
H(Sj→[1:j−1]|W[1:j−1]) +H(W[1:n−1])
=
n−1∑
j=2
H(Sj→[1:j−1])−
n−1∑
j=1
I(Sj→[1:j−1];W[1:j−1])
+H(W[1:n−1])
(c)
=
n−1∑
j=2
H(Sj+1→[2:j])−
n−1∑
j=1
I(Sj→[1:j−1];W[1:j−1])
+H(W[1:n−1])
≥ H(S→[2:n−1])−
n−1∑
j=1
I(Sj→[1:j−1];W[1:j−1])
+H(W[1:n−1]) (B.15)
where (a) follows from the fact that Wi is a function of (W[1:i−1], S→i) = Li−1,i by
Lemma 1; (b) follows from the fact that S[i+1;j−1]→i is a function of W[1:j−1]; and (c)
follows from the fact that H(Sj→[1:j−1]) = H(Sj+1→[2:j]) due to the symmetrical code that
we consider.
Further note that
H(S→[2:n−1]) +H(W1)
≥ H(W1, S→[2:n−1]) = H(L1,n−1). (B.16)
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Adding (B.15)–(B.16) gives:
n−1∑
i=1
H(S→i|W[1:i−1]) +H(W1)
≥ H(L1,n−1) +H(W[1:n−1])−
n−1∑
j=1
I(Sj→[1:j−1];W[1:j−1])
(a)
≥ H(L1,n−1) +H(W[1:n−1])−
n−1∑
j=1
I(Wj;W[1:j−1])
= H(L1,n−1) +H(W[1:n−1])
−
n−1∑
j=1
(
H(Wj) +H(W[1:j−1])−H(W[1:j])
)
= H(L1,n−1) + 2H(W[1:n−1])−
n−1∑
j=1
H(Wj)
(b)
≥ 3H(W[1:n−1])−
n−1∑
j=1
H(Wj) (B.17)
where (a) follows from the fact that Sj→[1:j−1] is a function ofWj; and (b) follows from the
fact thatW[2:n−1] is a function of L1,n−1 by Lemma 1 so we haveH(L1,n−1) ≥ H(W[1:n−1]).
Finally, by the node-capacity constraint, we have
nα ≥ H(W1) +
n−1∑
j=1
H(Wj). (B.18)
Adding (B.17) and (B.18) gives:
n−1∑
i=1
H(S→i|W[1:i−1]) + nα
≥ 3H(W[1:n−1]) (a)= 3H(W[1:n],M) (b)= 3H(W[1:n],M, S→1)
≥ 3H(M, S→1) = 3H(S→1) + 3H(M|S→1)
(c)
= 3H(S→1) + 3H(M) = 3H(S→1) + 3B
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where (a) follows from the facts that M is a function of W[1:n−1] by the message-recovery
requirement (3.2) and that Wn is a function of S→n, which is in turn a function of W[1:n−1];
(b) follows from the fact that S→1 is a function of W[2:n]; and (c) follows from the repair-
secrecy requirement (3.4) with ` = 1. This completes the proof of Lemma 4.
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THE LEMMAS FOR CACHING PROBLEM
C.1 Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. In this proof, we need to use induction. Obviously (4.27) holds for p = 1. We
assume when it holds for p = k, then, and for p = k + 1 ≤ N − 1, we have
H(Z1) + (k + 1)H(X2,K)
≥H(Z1,W[k]) + kH(Xk+1,K |Z1,W[k]) +H(X2,K) (C.1)
=H(Z1,W[k]) + kH(Xk+2,K |Z1,W[k]) +H(Xk+1,k+2,K) (C.2)
≥H(Z1,W[k+1]) +H(Xk+1,k+2,K |Z1,W[k+1]) + kH(Xk+2,K |Z1,W[k]) (C.3)
=H(Z1,W[k+1]) +H(Xk+2,K |Z1,W[k+1]) + kH(Xk+2,K |Z1,W[k]) (C.4)
≥H(Z1,W[k+1]) + (k + 1)H(Xk+2,K |Z1,W[k]). (C.5)
In (C.2), H(Xk+1,K |Z1,W[k]) = H(Xk+2,K |Z1,W[k]) is because of the symmetry under
file index permutation k + 1 ↔ k + 2. Similarly, we have H(X2,K) = H(Xk+1,k+2,K)
because of file index permutation 1↔ k + 1, 2↔ k + 2.
In (C.4), H(Xk+1,k+2,K |Z1,W[k+1]) = H(Xk+2,K |Z1,W[k+1]) is also because of file index
permutation: switching file index 1 and k + 1 can help us get this.
This induction gives us that inequality (4.27) holds for every p ≤ N−1. When p = N ,
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inequality (4.27) is degraded as
H(Z1) +NH(X2,K)
=H(ZK) +H(X[2:N ],K) +H(X2,1,K) (C.6)
≥H(ZK ,W[N ]) (C.7)
=H(Z1,W[N ]) (C.8)
In (C.6), we have
H(X2,K) = H(X3,K) = · · · = H(XN,K)
according to file index symmetry and so is the reason forH(X2,K) = H(X2,1,K). In (C.8),
H(ZK ,W[N ]) = H(Z1,W[N ]) is because of the symmetry for user index, a permutation
switch user index 1 and K will help us get that.
Combine them both we have the whole proof for Lemma 6.
C.2 Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. When K = 2, this inequality trivially degraded to
H(W[p]) ≥ pF, (C.9)
which is obvious. Therefore we only need to focus on K ≥ 3.
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Firstly, we can see
(K − 2)H(Z1,W[p])
+
(K − 2)(K − 3)
2
(N − p)H(Xp+1,K |Z1,W[p])
≥(K − 2)H(Z1,W[p])
+
(K − 2)(K − 3)
2
H(X[p+1:N ],K |Z1,W[p]) (C.10)
=
K−2∑
i=1
[H(Z1,W[p]) + (i− 1)H(X[p+1:N ],K |Z1,W[p])] (C.11)
=
K−2∑
i=1
[H(Z1,W[p]) + (i− 1)H(X[p+1:N ],K |Z1,W[p])] (C.12)
≥
K−2∑
i=1
[H(ZK−i+1,W[p]) +H(X[p+1:N ],[K−i+2:K]|ZK−i+1,W[p])] (C.13)
=
K−2∑
i=1
H(ZK−i+1,W[p], X[p+1:N ],[K−i+2:K]). (C.14)
Need to mention that when i = 1, we regard X[p+1:N ],[K−i+2:K] as an empty set. Also, in
formula (C.13), we have (i−1)H(X[p+1:N ],K |Z1,W[p]) ≥ H(X[p+1:N ],[K−i+2:K]|ZK−i+1,W[p])
because for each k ∈ [K − i + 2 : K], as long as [K − i + 2 : K] is not empty, we have
H(X[p+1:N ],K |Z1,W[p]) = H(X[p+1:N ],k|Z1,W[p]) according to the symmetry of user in-
dex.
Consider following inequality:
H(W[p], X[p+1:N ],[k:K]) +H(Zk,W[p], X[p+1:N ],[k+1:K])
≥H(Zk,W[p], X[p+1:N ],[k:K]) +H(W[p], X[p+1:N ],[k+1:K])
≥NF +H(W[p], X[p+1:N ],[k+1:K]) (C.15)
If we sum up all k ∈ [3 : K − 1], we have
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K−1∑
k=3
[
H(W[p], X[p+1:N ],[k:K]) +H(Zk,W[p], X[p+1:N ],[k+1:K])
]
≥
K−1∑
k=3
(
NF +H(W[p], X[p+1:N ],[k+1:K])
)
(C.16)
Notice that
K−1∑
k=4
H(W[p], X[p+1:N ],[k:K]) =
K−2∑
k=3
H(W[p], X[p+1:N ],[k+1:K]), (C.17)
which means that they can be canceled from both sides of inequality. Meanwhile, we can
rewrite our expression as
K−1∑
k=3
H(Zk,W[p], X[p+1:N ],[k+1:K])
=
K−2∑
i=2
H(ZK−i+1,W[p], X[p+1:N ],[K−i+2:K]). (C.18)
Take (C.18) back to (C.16), we have
H(W[p], X[p+1:N ],[3:K]) +
K−2∑
i=2
H(ZK−i+1,W[p], X[p+1:N ],[K−i+2:K])
≥(K − 3)NF +H(W[p], X[p+1:N ],K). (C.19)
On the other hand, we have
H(W[p], X[p+1:N ],K) +H(ZK ,W[p])
≥H(ZK ,W[p], X[p+1:N ],K) +H(W[p])
≥NF + pF (C.20)
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Combine (C.19) and (C.19), we have
H(W[p], X[p+1:N ],[3:K]) + (K − 2)H(Z1,W[p])
+
(K − 2)(K − 3)
2
(N − p)H(Xp+1,K |Z1,W[p])
≥H(W[p], X[p+1:N ],[3:K]) +
K−2∑
i=1
H(ZK−i+1,W[p], X[p+1:N ],[K−i+2:K]) (C.21)
=H(W[p], X[p+1:N ],[3:K]) +
K−2∑
i=2
H(ZK−i+1,W[p], X[p+1:N ],[K−i+2:K]) +H(ZK ,W[p])
(C.22)
≥(K − 3)NF +H(W[p], X[p+1:N ],K) +H(ZK ,W[p]) (C.23)
≥(K − 3)NF +NF + pF (C.24)
=(K − 2)NF + pF (C.25)
Hence Lemma 2 is proved.
C.3 Proof of Lemma 8
Proof. When K = 2, the proof is trivial as following:
When K = 2, X[p+1:N ],[3:2] and X[p+1:N ],[3:2] are empty sets. Hence Lemma 8 is degrade as
2H(Z1,W[p]) + (N − p)H(Xp+1,2|Z1,W[p])
≥H(Z[2],W[p]) + (N − p)H(Xp+1,2|Z1,W[p]) +H(W[p])
≥H(Z[2],W[p], X[p+1:N ],2) +H(W[p])
≥N + p (C.26)
Therefore, now we put our focus on the case that K ≥ 3. According to symmetry in file
index, we have following claims:
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• For any p+ 1 ≤ N , we have:
(N − p)H(Xp+1,K |Z1,W[p]) ≥ H(X[p+1:N ],K |Z1,W[p]) (C.27)
where (C.27) follows the fact that
H(Xp+1,K |Z1,W[p]) = H(Xi,K |Z1,W[p]) (C.28)
for any i ∈ [p+ 1 : N ].
• for any i, j ∈ [k − 1] and p+ 1 ≤ N , we have
H(X[p+1:N ],k|Zi,W[p]) = H(X[p+1:N ],k|Zj,W[p]) (C.29)
where (C.29) follows a permutation on the user index that pi : i↔ j.
• For any k1, k2 ∈ [i+ 1 : K] and p+ 1 ≤ N , we have
H(X[p+1:N ],k1|Zi,W[p]) = H(X[p+1:N ],k2 |Zi,W[p]) (C.30)
where (C.30) follows a permutation on the user index that pi : k1 ↔ k2.
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With all claims above, we have
H(Z1,W[p]) + (K − 2)(N − p)H(Xp+1,K |Z1,W[p])
(a)
≥H(Z1,W[p]) + (K − 2)H(X[p+1:N ],K |Z1,W[p])
(b)
=H(Z1,W[p]) +
K∑
k=3
H(X[p+1:N ],k|Z1,W[p])
≥H(Z1,W[p]) +H(X[p+1:N ],[3:K]|Z1,W[p])
=H(Z1,W[p], X[p+1:N ],[3:K]) (C.31)
(a) follows (C.27) and (b) follows (C.29).
Further more,
2H(Z1,W[p], X[p+1:N ],[3:K])
=H(Z1,W[p], X[p+1:N ],[3:K]) +H(Z2,W[p], X[p+1:N ],[3:K]) (C.32)
≥H(Z[2],W[p], X[p+1:N ],[3:K]) +H(W[p], X[p+1:N ],[3:K]) (C.33)
≥H(Z[2],W[p], X[p+1:N ],3) +H(W[p], X[p+1:N ],[3:K]) (C.34)
H(Z[2],W[p], X[p+1:N ],3), the first item in (C.34), satisfies
H(Z[2],W[p], X[p+1:N ],3) + (N − p)H(Xp+1,K |Z1,W[p])
=H(Z[2],W[p], X[p+1:N ],3) + (N − p)H(Xp+1,2|Z1,W[p]) (C.35)
≥H(Z[2],W[p], X[p+1:N ],3) +H(X[p+1:N ],2|Z1,W[p]) (C.36)
≥H(Z[2],W[p], X[p+1:N ],2, X[p+1:N ],3) (C.37)
≥N, (C.38)
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and H(W[p], X[p+1:N ],[3:K]), the second item in (C.34), satisfies
H(W[p], X[p+1:N ],[3:K]) + (K − 2)H(Z1,W[p])
+
(K − 2)(K − 3)
2
(N − p)H(Xp+1,K |Z1,W[p])
≥(K − 2)N + p (C.39)
(C.39) follows Lemma (7). By adding (C.31)), (C.38)) and (C.39)) together, we have
Lemma 8.
C.4 Proof of Lemma 9
Proof. When A=1, we have
H(X(i+1,k+1)|Z[k],W[i]) +H(Z[k+1],W[i])
=H(Z[k+1],W[i], X(i+1,k+1)) (C.40)
=H(Z[k+1],W[i+1], X(i+1,k+1)) (C.41)
=H(X(i+1,k+1)|Z[k+1],W[i+1]) +H(Z[k+1],W[i+1]) (C.42)
=H(X(i+2,k+2)|Z[k+1],W[i+1]) +H(Z[k+1],W[i+1]) (C.43)
In (C.43), we haveH(X(i+1,k+1)|Z[k+1],W[i+1]) = H(X(i+2,k+2)|Z[k+1],W[i+1]) by switch-
ing file index i+ 2 and N −K + (k + 2), i+ 1 and k + 1. More precisely, we have
X(i+1,k+1) = X(1, 2, . . . , k︸ ︷︷ ︸
k users
,i+1,N −K + (k + 2), . . . , N︸ ︷︷ ︸
K−k−1 users
)
(C.44)
X(i+2,k+2) = X(1, 2, . . . , k, k + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k+1 users
,i+2,N −K + (k + 3), . . . , N︸ ︷︷ ︸
K−k−2 users
)
. (C.45)
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By comparison, we can find see the corresponding permutation clearly. Now, we assume
(4.51) holds for A = m. When A = m+ 1 ≤ N − (K − k)− 1, we have
(m+ 1)H(X(i+1,k+1)|Z[k],W[i]) +H(Z[k+1],W[i])
≥mH(X(i+m+1,k+2)|Z[k+1],W[i+m]) +H(Z[k+1],W[i+m]) +H(X(i+1,k+1)|Z[k],W[i])
(C.46)
=mH(X(i+m+1,k+2)|Z[k+1],W[i+m]) +H(Z[k+1],W[i+m]) +H(X(i+m+1,k+1)|Z[k],W[i])
(C.47)
≥mH(X(i+m+1,k+2)|Z[k+1],W[i+m]) +H(Z[k+1],W[i+m+1])
+H(X(i+m+1,k+1)|Z[k+1],W[i+m+1]) (C.48)
=mH(X(i+m+1,k+2)|Z[k+1],W[i+m]) +H(Z[k+1],W[i+m+1])
+H(X(i+m+2,k+2)|Z[k+1],W[i+m+1]) (C.49)
≥mH(X(i+m+2,k+2)|Z[k+1],W[i+m+1]) +H(Z[k+1],W[i+m+1])
+H(X(i+m+2,k+2)|Z[k+1],W[i+m+1]) (C.50)
=(m+ 1)H(X(i+m+2,k+2)|Z[k+1],W[i+m+1]) +H(Z[k+1],W[i+m+1]) (C.51)
In (C.49),
H(X(i+m+1,k+1)|Z[k+1],W[i+m+1]) = H(X(i+m+2,k+2)|Z[k+1],W[i+m+1])
because of switching i+m+ 2 and N −K + (k + 2).
By induction we proved this lemma.
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C.5 Proof of Lemma 10
Proof. As our definition, we have
k ≤ pk ≤ k + (N −K)− 1 (C.52)
First half is because of
pk
=bk(k + 1)N
K(K + 1)
c (C.53)
≥bk(k + 1)
2
c (C.54)
≥k. (C.55)
For the second half, We obviously have that
pk = bk(k + 1)N
K(K + 1)
c ≤ k(k + 1)N
K(K + 1)
. (C.56)
Further more, since
N − k(k + 1)N
K(K + 1)
− (K − k)
=
K(K + 1)− k(k + 1)
K(K + 1)
N − (K − k) (C.57)
=
(K − k)(K + k + 1)
K(K + 1)
N − (K − k) (C.58)
=(K − k)((K + k + 1)
K(K + 1)
N − 1) (C.59)
≥(K − k)((K + k + 1)
2
− 1) (C.60)
≥1, (C.61)
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that is to say,
k(k + 1)N
K(K + 1)
≤ k + (N −K)− 1 (C.62)
Hence (C.52) is proved. (C.52) ensures that every X(pk+1,k+1) and X(pk+2,k+1) is legiti-
mate by our definition, thus we can make sure pk ≥ k and pk + 1 ≤ k + 1 + (N −K).
Now we go back to our proof. We use induction to prove (4.54). Firstly, when k = 1, we
have
(K + 1)!MF + (K − 1)!2NRF
=(K − 1)![K(K + 1)− q1][MF + p1RF ]
+ (K − 1)!q1[NF + (p1 + 1)RF ] (C.63)
≥(K − 1)![K(K + 1)− q1][H(Z1) + p1H(X1,2,...,K)]
+ (K − 1)!q1[H(Z1) + (p1 + 1)H(X1,2,...,K)] (C.64)
≥(K − 1)![K(K + 1)− q1][H(Z1,W[p1]) + p1H(X(p1+1,2)|Z1,W[p1])]
+ (K − 1)!q1[H(Z1,W[p1+1]) + p1H(X(p1+1,2)|Z1,W[p1]) +H(X(p1+2,2)|Z1,W[p1+1])]
(C.65)
=(K − 1)![(K(K + 1)− q1)H(Z1,W[p1]) + q1H(Z1,W[p1+1])]
+ (K − 1)![(K(K + 1)p1H(X(p1+1,2)|Z1,W[p1]) + q1H(X(p1+2,2)|Z1,W[p1+1])]
(C.66)
Need to explain that in (C.65),
H(Z1) + p1H(X1,2,...,K)
≥H(Z1,W[p1]) + p1H(X(p1+1,2)|Z1,W[p1]) (C.67)
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is by Lemma 9 with setting A = p1 and i = 0, and
H(Z1) + (p1 + 1)H(X1,2,...,K)
≥H(Z1,W[p1+1]) + p1H(X(p1+1,2)|Z1,W[p1]) +H(X(p1+2,2)|Z1,W[p1+1]) (C.68)
is by applying lemma 1 twice, setting A = p1, i = 0 and A = 1, i = p1 respectively.
If we assume (4.54) holds for some k, then for k + 1, we have
(K + 1)!MF + (K − 1)!2NRF
≥(K − 1)!
k
[(K(K + 1)− qk)H(Z[k],W[pk]) + qkH(Z[k],W[pk+1])]
+
(K − 1)!
k
[(2kN − qk)H(X(pk+1,k+1)|Z[k],W[pk])
+ qkH(X(pk+2,k+1)|Z[k],W[pk+1])]
+ (k − 1)(K − 1)!NF
≥(K − 1)!
k
k
k + 1
[(K(K + 1)− qk)H(Z[k+1],W[pk]) + qkH(Z[k+1],W[pk+1])]
+
(K − 1)!
k
1
k + 1
[(K(K + 1)− qk)H(W[pk]) + qkH(W[pk+1])]
+
(K − 1)!
k
[(2kN − qk)H(X(pk+1,k+1)|Z[k],W[pk])
+ qkH(X(pk+2,k+1)|Z[k],W[pk+1])]
+ (k − 1)(K − 1)!NF (C.69)
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(C.69) is according to Han’s Inequality as following:
H(Z[k],W[p])
=H(Z[k]|W[p]) +H(W[p])
≥ k
k + 1
H(Z[k+1]|W[p]) +H(W[p]) (C.70)
=
k
k + 1
H(Z[k+1],W[p]) +
1
k + 1
H(W[p]) (C.71)
Since H(W[p]) = pF as our definition, we can simplify some items in (C.69):
(K − 1)!
k
1
k + 1
[(K(K + 1)− qk)H(W[pk]) + qkH(W[pk+1])]
=
(K − 1)!
k
1
k + 1
[K(K + 1)pkF + qkF ]
=
(K − 1)!
k
1
k + 1
[k(k + 1)NF ]
=(K − 1)!NF, (C.72)
This result can be combined with item (k − 1)(K − 1)!NF . For the remaining part,
according to Lemma 9, we have following separated steps:
Firstly,
(K − 1)!
k
k
k + 1
[(K(K + 1)− qk)H(Z[k+1],W[pk]) + qkH(Z[k+1],W[pk+1])]
+
(K − 1)!
k + 1
(K(K + 1)− qk)H(X(pk+1,k+1)|Z[k],W[pk])
≥(K − 1)!
k + 1
K(K + 1)H(Z[k+1],W[pk+1])
+
(K − 1)!
k + 1
(K(K + 1)− qk)H(X(pk+2,k+2)|Z[k+1],W[pk+1]) (C.73)
≥(K − 1)!
k + 1
K(K + 1)H(Z[k+1],W[pk+1])
+
(K − 1)!
k + 1
(K(K + 1)− qk)H(X(pk+1+1,k+2)|Z[k+1],W[pk+1]). (C.74)
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by setting A = 1 and i = pk. In (C.74), we have
H(X(pk+2,k+2)|Z[k+1],W[pk+1])
=H(X(pk+1+1,k+2)|Z[k+1],W[pk+1])
≥H(X(pk+1+1,k+2)|Z[k+1],W[pk+1])
because of symmetry under permutation.
Secondly, we have
(K − 1)!
k + 1
K(K + 1)H(Z[k+1],W[pk+1])
+
(K − 1)!
k + 1
K(K + 1)(pk+1 − pk − 1)H(X(pk+2,k+1)|Z[k],W[pk+1])
≥(K − 1)!
k + 1
K(K + 1)H(Z[k+1],W[pk+1])
+
(K − 1)!
k + 1
K(K + 1)(pk+1 − pk − 1)H(X(pk+1+1,k+2)|Z[k+1],W[pk+1]) (C.75)
according to Lemma 9 as well by setting A = pk+1 − pk − 1 and i = pk + 1, and at last
for the third step, we have
(K − 1)!
k + 1
qk+1H(Z[k+1],W[pk+1])
+
(K − 1)!
k + 1
qk+1H(X(pk+2,k+1)|Z[k],W[pk+1])
≥(K − 1)!
k + 1
qk+1H(Z[k+1],W[pk+1+1])
+
(K − 1)!
k + 1
qk+1H(X(pk+1+2,k+2)|Z[k],W[pk+1+1]) (C.76)
by setting A = 1 and i = pk+1.
From (C.74) to (C.76), these three steps turn everyH(Z[k+1],W[pk]) intoH(Z[k+1],W[pk+1])
orH(Z[k+1],W[pk+1+1]), and turn allH(X(pk+1,k+1)|Z[k],W[pk]) andH(X(pk+2,k+1)|Z[k],W[pk+1])
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intoH(X(pk+1+1,k+2)|Z[k+1],W[pk+1]) andH(X(pk+1+2,k+2)|Z[k+1],W[pk+1+1]). We will ver-
ify the coefficient of these three steps as following.
The summation of those coefficients is like:
(K − 1)!
k + 1
(K(K + 1)− qk)
+
(K − 1)!
k + 1
K(K + 1)(pk+1 − pk − 1)
+
(K − 1)!
k + 1
qk+1
=
(K − 1)!
k + 1
[K(K + 1)− qk +K(K + 1)(pk+1 − pk)−K(K + 1) + qk+1] (C.77)
=
(K − 1)!
k + 1
[K(K + 1)(pk+1 − pk) + qk+1 − qk] (C.78)
=
(K − 1)!
k + 1
[((k + 1)(k + 2)N − qk+1)− (k(k + 1)N − qk) + qk+1 − qk] (C.79)
=
(K − 1)!
k + 1
2(k + 1)N (C.80)
=(K − 1)!2N (C.81)
Since we have
kK(K + 1) + qk
≤kK(K + 1) +K(K + 1) (C.82)
=(k + 1)K(K + 1) (C.83)
≤(k + 1)2N (C.84)
≤k(k + 1)2N, (C.85)
which implies
1
k
(2kN − qk) ≥ 1
k + 1
[K(K + 1)− qk] (C.86)
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and hence
(K − 1)!
k
(2kN − qk) ≥ (K − 1)!
k + 1
(K(K + 1)− qk). (C.87)
On the other hand, since
H(X(pk+1,k+1)|Z[k],W[pk]) ≥ H(X(pk+2,k+1)|Z[k],W[pk+1]), (C.88)
together we have
(K − 1)!
k
[(2kN − qk)H(X(pk+1,k+1)|Z[k],W[pk])
+ qkH(X(pk+2,k+1)|Z[k],W[pk+1])]
≥(K − 1)!
k + 1
(K(K + 1)− qk))H(X(pk+1,k+1)|Z[k],W[pk])
+
(K − 1)!
k + 1
K(K + 1)(pk+1 − pk − 1)H(X(pk+2,k+1)|Z[k],W[pk+1])
+
(K − 1)!
k + 1
qk+1H(X(pk+2,k+1)|Z[k],W[pk+1]) (C.89)
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According to (C.89), now we have
(K − 1)!
k
k
k + 1
[(K(K + 1)− qk)H(Z[k+1],W[pk]) + qkH(Z[k+1],W[pk+1])]
+
(K − 1)!
k
[(2kN − qk)H(X(pk+1,k+1)|Z[k],W[pk])
+ qkH(X(pk+2,k+1)|Z[k],W[pk+1])]
≥(K − 1)!
k
k
k + 1
[(K(K + 1)− qk)H(Z[k+1],W[pk]) + qkH(Z[k+1],W[pk+1])]
+
(K − 1)!
k + 1
(K(K + 1)− qk))H(X(pk+1,k+1)|Z[k],W[pk])
+
(K − 1)!
k + 1
K(K + 1)(pk+1 − pk − 1)H(X(pk+2,k+1)|Z[k],W[pk+1])
+
(K − 1)!
k + 1
qk+1H(X(pk+2,k+1)|Z[k],W[pk+1]) (C.90)
≥(K − 1)!
k + 1
[(K(K + 1)− qk+1)H(Z[k+1],W[pk+1]) + qk+1H(Z[k+1],W[pk+1+1])]
+
(K − 1)!
k + 1
[(2(k + 1)N − qk+1)H(X(pk+1+1,k+2)|Z[k+1],W[pk+1])
+ qkH(X(pk+1+2,k+2)|Z[k+1],W[pk+1+1])] (C.91)
(C.91) can be parted into three steps, each is prove in (C.74) to (C.76) respectively.
Therefore, we have
(K + 1)!MF + (K − 1)!2NRF
≥(K − 1)!
k + 1
[(K(K + 1)− qk+1)H(Z[k+1],W[pk+1]) + qk+1H(Z[k+1],W[pk+1+1])]
+
(K − 1)!
k + 1
[(2(k + 1)N − qk+1)H(X(pk+1+1,k+2)|Z[k+1],W[pk+1])
+ qkH(X(pk+1+2,k+2)|Z[k+1],W[pk+1+1])]
+ k(K − 1)!NF, (C.92)
which fulfill the induction to show Lemma 10.
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